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THE
ATTLE OF MANASSAS

BEAUREGARD

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




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A COMMENTARY ON THE CAMPAIGN
AND
BATTLE OF MANASSAS
OF JULY, 1861

TOGETHER WITH A SUMMARY OF THE ART
OF WAR

BY
GEN. G. T. BEAUREGARD

G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS
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PREFACE.

THE following commentary upon the campaign and battle of Manassas was originally purposed as a magazine article consequent to the raising by General Joseph E. Johnston of certain personal claims in respect to those events, in an article published by him in the *Century* magazine for May, 1885.

The full treatment of the subject, however, carried these pages beyond the limits of a magazine paper and their publication was therefore deferred.

Perhaps I might have left the question raised by the author of that article to be determined upon the facts as already known and attested. On the other hand, I have considered that, when an historical issue is made, it may be justly required that he whom it chiefly concerns should contribute thoroughly to its elucidation, leaving impartial history to decide. It is under the sense of this duty, mani-

fold in its aspects, that I have felt bound to make a circumstantial exposition of the subject in question, with all its pertinent relations.

In order to aid the non-professional reader to a better understanding of what was the proper military conduct on the Confederate side at the time and under the conditions covered by the present commentary, I have appended a summary of the Art of War which—together with certain orders issued by me while commanding in Northern Virginia and in the West, and of permanent applicability in the business of war—I had published in pamphlet form at Charleston in 1863 for the instruction of the officers in my Department.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

YELLOW SULPHUR SPRINGS, VA.,
July 10, 1890.



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
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FIELD OF OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA ANTE

A COMMENTARY ON THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

IN a narrative of the campaign and battle of Manassas, written at the request of the Editor of the *Century*,¹ it was stated by General Beauregard that, when the Confederate Army of the Potomac, covering Manassas Junction, was about to be attacked by the superior Federal Army, then advancing on Richmond from Washington, and the Confederate government, at his instance, permitted General Joseph E. Johnston to unite the Army of the Shenandoah with his, General Johnston, though the ranking officer, expressly left with General Beauregard the actual command and direction of the battle about to take place. In stating this fact the writer but repeated what he had always stated in proper time and place by word of mouth and writing, from the day of the battle, and what had been the generally known history of that event.

¹ *Century* for November, 1884. The reader is referred to that article in connection with the present Commentary.

General Johnston, however, in his more recent article in the *Century* on Seven Pines, turns back first to the battle of Manassas for the purpose of attempting to reverse this history, treating it as an "accusation" published by the Southern President and indorsed by General Beauregard.

As far as General Johnston himself is concerned the sufficient reply were to refer him back to his own consciousness at the time of the event and in the circumstances surrounding the situation. But public controversy being made by him, it is proper that to the historical reader should be given in stated form the testimony of certain facts.

I.

In the general detailed report of the battle, which, as the actual commander, General Beauregard made, not to General Johnston his senior, but directly to the Adjutant-General of the Confederate States Army, the fact that General Johnston, though the ranking officer on the field, had left with him the command of the forces for the battle is thus clearly expressed :

“General Johnston arrived here about noon of the 20th of July, and being my senior in rank, he necessarily assumed command of all the forces of the Confederate States then concentrating at this point. Made acquainted with my plan of operations to meet the enemy, he gave them his entire approval and generously directed their execution *under my command*.”

Again towards the end of his report he refers to General Johnston as follows :

“It must be permitted me here to record my profound sense of my obligations to General Johnston for his generous permission to carry out my plans with such modi-

fications as circumstances [not General Johnston] had required."

In another official document immediately belonging to the event, the fact is even more comprehensively stated. General (Stonewall) Jackson's brigade was part of the Shenandoah forces, and, he having claimed that certain colors captured by his men were properly returnable to the headquarters of the Army of the Shenandoah, General Beauregard replied to him by the following letter :

MANASSAS, VA., Aug. 16, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL,

Your letter of this day to Col. Jordan relative to the 1st Regt., Michigan colors, captured on the 21st ult., by a private in Co. A of the 27th Regt., Va. Vols., of your brigade, has been referred to me. In reply I have to state that said colors, with the other trophies of that day, were sent to me for collection, and because *I commanded in person on the field on that occasion, being responsible for the success or failure of the battle.*¹ All those trophies will be sent with my Report to the Genl. Com'dg for transmission to the War Dept., with a history, as far as it can be made out, of the capture of each trophy, and I shall be most happy in my Report to do full justice to the gallantry and brilliant services of yourself and those under your command.

As Genl. Johnston has not yet made out his report, I would suggest that you so amend your report as to contain the history of the capture of said colors.

¹ Present italics.

Should you, however, prefer sending to Genl. J. directly, I shall be happy to send them to you for that object.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General T. J. JACKSON,
Com'dg 1st brigade, Second Corps,
Army of Potomac.

Moreover the order of battle as drawn by General Beauregard was issued formally "By command of General Beauregard," and signed by his Adjutant-General, and in that form was approved by General Johnston in writing. General Beauregard accordingly, throughout the battle, issued his orders to all the forces in his own name.

The foregoing documents show how the matter stood with General Beauregard, and it may be left to the general judgment, especially that of military men sensible of the strict rules and bearing of the profession, whether, in a matter of such vital moment to the army and the people, and of such extreme professional point as General Johnston himself now makes it, there could well have occurred any mistake.

As to the contemporaneous view of the Confederate military authorities, the following letters of the Secretary of War and of General Lee, then acting as Commander-in-chief, explain themselves:

C. S. of A. WAR DEPARTMENT,
RICHMOND, July 24th, 1861.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

Accept my congratulations for the glorious and most brilliant victory achieved by you.

The Country will bless and honor you for it.

Believe me, dear General,

Truly your friend,

(Signed)

L. P. WALKER.

General BEAUREGARD.

RICHMOND, 24th July, 1861.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I cannot express the joy I feel at the brilliant victory of the 21st. The skill, courage, and endurance displayed by yourself excite my highest admiration.

You and your troops have the gratitude of the whole country, and I offer to all my heartfelt congratulations at their success.

The glorious dead are at peace. I grieve for their loss and sympathize with the living. May your subsequent course be attended with like success.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

R. E. LEE.

General BEAUREGARD.

When General Johnston published his "Narrative" or memoirs some years ago, General Beauregard's attention was called by a critical reader to the structure of his account of the Manassas campaign as being carefully framed to carry to the uninformed the idea that the success of the battle was due to him

not only as the actual commander in the battle, but that the strategy of concentration also emanated from him. General Beauregard thereupon communicated with certain gentlemen, in the best position, as he thought, to judge, asking their view of the purport of that account; but to them—under the influence possibly of their knowledge of the facts—it presented no such purpose or effect. He therefore took no notice of it in anticipation of the publication of his own memoirs.

General Johnston, in his *Century* article, quotes General Early¹ as saying that when he,—General Johnston—arrived at Manassas on the afternoon of the 20th of July, the eve of the battle, he had issued an order addressed to the subordinate commanders of General Beauregard's army, assuming the command. But, while quoting General Early to a fragmentary statement suggestively in his favor, General Johnston should have been candid, and added that General Early at the same time had also mentioned that General Johnston nevertheless left with General Beauregard the actual command for the battle. This, then, is stating no more than General Beauregard himself did in the report of the battle, and signifies nothing to the real point. General Early in this but re-stated the notorious fact.

General Johnston, however, seeks to sustain his point by the following absolute proposition:

¹ From a manuscript narrative that as yet the writer has not seen published.

Such conduct would have been as base as flight from the field in the heat of battle, and would have brought on me the contempt of every honorable soldier. It is disproved by the fact that General Beauregard was willing to serve under me there and again in North Carolina near the close of the war and associated with me.—*Century*, p. 101.

This is a begging of the question, and being advanced as his main "disproof," might be said, from its emptiness, to yield the whole question. It is answered, however, that General J. E. Johnston may not claim any loftier moral character as a soldier than General A. S. Johnston, who, upon effecting his junction with General Beauregard at Corinth, Mississippi, in March, 1862, declared his purpose to withdraw his personal headquarters to a point in the department remote from the field of operations, leaving General Beauregard, his junior, in sole command of their united forces then about to encounter the Federal army under General Grant,¹ and for reasons which he considered beneficial to the service.* General Beauregard certainly deemed his conduct not base, but most unselfish, and, to the end that he might redeem his name from the effect of his recent serial disasters, urged him to remain so as to share in a trusted success and "associated" with him most cordially and with the highest respect. Other instances could be mentioned in our own and

¹ "Life of General A. S. Johnston," by his son, pp. 549, 550.

² "Military Operations of General Beauregard," by Alfred Roman, vol. i., p. 215—Shiloh.

in foreign history of self-postponement on the part of men of soldierly character fully as bright as that of General J. E. Johnston.¹ It had always been considered, not only by General Beauregard, but by the Confederate military authorities, who afterwards intrusted him with high command (which they would not have done had they deemed his conduct "base"), as also by the army, the people and in approving history, that General Johnston had in this juncture put aside the accident of seniority from patriotic motives, and he cannot point to an imputation from any source but his own present that it was viewed as other than an honorable act. But, as he now reveals that with him the matter is to be weighed as a question of purely personal sen-

¹ In the war with Mexico, General Shields came with his command on the immediate field on the afternoon before the battle of Contreras, and, believing that General P. F. Smith, who was then confronting General Santa Anna, was his senior, looked to him for instructions. Though it was made known that General Smith was his junior, nevertheless General Shields, under the circumstances, consented to leave with him the command for the coming battle, which was fought and won next morning.

During the late war, in the month of July, 1864, Lieutenant-General Richard H. Anderson reinforced Lieutenant-General Early, then operating in the Shenandoah Valley against General Sheridan. Though Early's senior, he expressly waived the command during a series of operations for a fortnight.

One of the most eminent of the Federal commanders, and a knightly soldier, the late General Hancock, furnished a similar instance in June, 1864, when General Grant changed his base to the south of the James, and attacked General Beauregard's force near Petersburg. General W. F. Smith had been sent forward with his corps to attack on the 15th. He was followed by Hancock. "General Hancock with two divisions of the Second Corps reached General Smith just after dark and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish waiving rank to the named commander who he

timent and personal responsibility, it may be said that there are men who, as soldiers called upon to display physical courage, would never flee from the field, yet might, under peculiar circumstances, prefer not to assume the responsibility of command, just as, when exercising the command, they might habitually refuse to join battle. The two springs of action are not the same.

General Johnston's own reputation grows mainly from the campaign made against him by General Sherman, before whom, nevertheless, he retreated without venturing serious combat from Ringgold to Atlanta—a country nearly a hundred miles in extent,—though many men of less talent but of mental constitution less preoccupied with the

naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs and what to do with the troops," and Hancock did as requested by Smith with his troops. (Grant's Rep.)

The ready service of the famous Marshal Boufflers under Marshal Villars, his junior, at the battle of Malplaquet, has received the highest praises of history; also that of Marshal Noailles (some of whose operations drew the critical praises of Frederick himself), who at the battle of Fontenoy served as first *aide-de-camp* to his junior, Marshal Saxe, "sacrificing the jealousy of command to the good of the State Marshal Saxe knew the full value of this magnanimity, and never was there stronger union between two men whom the ordinary weakness of the human heart might have estranged from one another." (*Précis du Siècle de Louis XV.*) The same high praise has been given to General Lord Hardinge, Governor-General of India, and Commander-in-chief of the forces, who, in the celebrated Sikh campaign, served under General Sir Hugh Gough. When Wellington (then General Wellesley) was operating in Portugal against Marshal Junot, General Burrard came with orders to supersede him. He informed himself as to Wellington's plan for the offensive before battle was joined, but expressly waived the command for the battle to Wellington, who thereupon won the victory of Vimiero and was pressing his offensive operations after the battle when Burrard assumed command and suspended further offensive action.

possibilities of defeat would have used the occasions offered by a territory so large, mountainous, and river-sected, and by the movements and occasional division of the enemy's forces, not only to contest the conquest of such a region, but to take the opportune offensive.

So when General Grant was aiming at General Pemberton's army and Vicksburg, while General Rosecrans was observing General Bragg in Eastern Tennessee, General Johnston occupied the country between those Confederate forces, but with the right specially conferred by President Davis to control and concentrate them all; nevertheless he took no decided action, and the Federal forces in the West were allowed to try every experiment at their leisure, in the face of our inactive forces, till Vicksburg fell with Pemberton's army, followed by consequences mortal to the Confederate States. General Johnston maintained that the President ought to have made himself responsible for the needed concentration by a direct order—that is to say, he expressly declined to exercise the responsibility put upon him by the scope of his command and the stress of the military situation.

This same backward inclination was also shown by him in Virginia, when in September, 1861, General Beauregard, being dissatisfied at the prolongation of our passive attitude, threw the Army of the Potomac forward to Fairfax Court-House, with its advanced outposts on Munson's and Mason's hills

within sight of the Federal capital, to provoke another battle through the pressure of the politicians upon General McClellan while his army was yet raw. General Johnston did not forbid the movement, but followed with his own troops (the Army of the Shenandoah). About the middle of October, however, he gave an order to fall back towards Manassas so suddenly that General Early, one of the brigade commanders of the Army of the Potomac, felt himself compelled to destroy valuable supplies, and the whole retrograde movement was so precipitate as to have all the appearance of an enforced retreat.¹

These facts are reluctantly referred to, as still others might be, because, in a question such as this raised by General Johnston, they serve to throw light on a temperament over-susceptible to apprehensions of military disaster, and therefore habitually averse to trying the issue of battle.

¹ General Johnston's desire was to fall back to Manassas. But General Beauregard was opposed to this on account of its then possible effect on the country as a seeming total abandonment of all we had gained by our victory, and proposed Centreville, the objection to which he overcame by constructing works defiladed against an obnoxious height at the possible disposal of the enemy. He mounted them with what became humorously known as Quaker guns. This device of armament successfully imposed on the enemy, who entered them only after their voluntary abandonment by General Johnston in the following spring after General Beauregard had gone to assume command in the West. Appendix A.

II.

To clearly view the subject, however, we must go back to the immediate time. General Johnston had been assigned to the command of the Army of the Shenandoah, defending that valley against the advance of General Patterson, and General Beauregard to the command of the Army of the Potomac at Manassas, covering the direct road to Richmond by which the main Federal army was manifestly intending to operate from Washington. With such resources as our new service afforded, General Beauregard had been preparing for the coming encounter, and had resolved to join battle on the line of Bull Run.¹ He was thus in the mind of the country and the government, as he was historically, responsible for the conflict on that field which was to decide primarily the issue of arms.

Being convinced for several reasons that the operations of General Patterson in the Shenandoah Valley were a mere diversion,² and that our true course under the circumstances was in a properly timed concentration at Manassas, the real Federal objective, he induced the government to direct

¹ Appendix B.

² Appendix F.

General Johnston to effect this concentration, which he deemed to be practicable by General Johnston resolutely attempting to evade General Patterson and closing the Blue Ridge gaps to his pursuit. This direction was made only upon the 17th of July, by telegraph, after McDowell's advancing forces had already on that day forced back the outposts of the Army of the Potomac at Fairfax Court-House. On the morning of the 18th, the Federal army was concentrated around Centreville, barely three miles distant from the Confederate position on Bull Run. Meanwhile, notwithstanding that order, General Johnston and Major Whiting, of his staff, had been questioning with General Beauregard the propriety of such a movement on General Johnston's part—a hesitation that was only removed by General Johnston learning that, on the day previous, General Patterson had disappeared from that quarter and marched to Charlestown, some twenty-three miles distant. On this same day (the 18th), General Beauregard's line was attacked at Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords and the enemy was repulsed.

General Johnston, believing himself to be freed from the vicinity of General Patterson, now began to move his forces across the Blue Ridge.¹ Thence

¹(Telegram :) “Winchester, July 18, 1861. General, I have had the honor to receive your telegram of yesterday. General Patterson seems to have moved yesterday to Charlestown, twenty-three miles to the east of Winchester. Unless he prevents it, we shall move towards General Beauregard to-day. (Signed) JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

“General S. COOPER, Richmond.”

they were conveyed to Manassas by railroad,—one brigade (Jackson's) and two regiments arriving on the afternoon of the 19th, and four regiments of Bee's and Bartow's brigades and some others with General Johnston in the early afternoon of the 20th. That the contest had not already been fully fought and ended for good or ill was solely due to the fortunate delay, since the 18th, of a renewed attack by the Federal army.

On General Johnston's arrival at Manassas Junction, General Beauregard explained to him his knowledge and views of the military situation, and, as General Johnston was the ranking officer, expected him to assume direct command; but General Johnston soon stated that, as he had come to General Beauregard's assistance, and as the latter knew both the country and the troops and had made his preparations for the event, while he himself was a stranger to both, he preferred that General Beauregard should exercise the command for the battle, while he would furnish him all assistance in his power—a deferment for which General Beauregard expressed his thanks at the moment.

There was a fitness in this conduct of which General Johnston, after the issue had been successful, need not have been ashamed, especially in that first vital event of the war before our armies had been thoroughly seasoned and disciplined, and before either of those officers had had much experience in command. It is true that General Johnston, in his *Century* paper, speaks of his own experience

in such terms as to convey to the reader that it had been very great. But in fact his only real experience of civilized warfare was in the Mexican campaign of 1847, where he never commanded more than four or five hundred men, while during the five years of his service as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 1st Cavalry (from which he passed to the Quarter-Master's Department) he hardly exercised a separate command of more than a couple of squadrons.

General Beauregard's experience, from the nature of his services in the Mexican campaign on the staff of the General-in-chief, was professionally much wider as respects the conduct of an army in the field.

The engineers, who were called to the staff of General Scott, the Commander-in-chief, were engaged in service of the highest order and importance, not usual to the corps of engineers in European armies, but conformable to what was expected of it in the American army, to supply the deficiency of high staff, on account of its being a *corps d'élite* composed of men who had their choice of service on graduation. They were in constant counsel with the Commander-in-chief respecting his plans of operation and their execution. To this must be added General Beauregard's recent operations ending in the reduction of Sumter and his administration of the considerable Confederate army assembled in that quarter.

As to the subsequent and contemporaneous experience of those two officers, after General Johnston had entered the Confederate army, the latter's

service in the Valley was inferior in importance and responsibility, both as to the number of forces and field of operations, to that of General Beauregard in Northern Virginia, even without counting what to the latter was at that time the great advantage of having conducted successfully the Bull Run battle of the 18th instant.

But the commanding facts were, that General Beauregard had been selected to direct operations within the district of the Potomac: the Army of the Potomac had been formed by him, and it is not venturous to say that he had the fullest confidence of that army, whereas General Johnston was a total stranger to it—facts supremely important in respect to an army of wholly new troops such as ours, whose immediate officers themselves had little or no experience in command. General Johnston was equally ignorant of the location of the troops and of the country, with which General Beauregard was familiar through daily reconnaissances made in front and on both flanks during nearly two months. Moreover the issue of the coming battle was to be decisive of the immediate fate of the Confederate States. If, in his earnestness for the cause, General Beauregard had sunk all consciousness of self in proposing and urging a strategy of concentration which involved the bringing on to the field of an officer senior to himself, it was not incredible or improper that at that moment General Johnston also should have proved self-denying.

III.

But General Johnston says (p. 102, *Century*):

"Instead of leaving the command in General Beauregard's hands, I assumed it over both armies immediately after my arrival on the 20th, showing General Beauregard as my warrant, the President's telegram."

And further, on page 101 :

"As to Mr. Davis' telegram (page 348¹), and the anxiety in Mr. Davis' mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding between General Beauregard and me—my inquiry was intended and calculated to establish beyond dispute our relative positions.

"As a Confederate Brigadier I had been junior to General Beauregard, but was created General by act of Congress. But as this had not been published to the army, it was not certain that it was known at Manassas. If it was not, the President's telegram gave the information and prevented what he seems to have apprehended."

This attempt by General Johnston, through a gratuitous imputation against the President, to borrow cause and meaning for the latter's telegram

¹ Of Mr. Davis' "Rise and Fall."

so as to further his own present object, fails. Mr. Davis' telegram, as will be seen, was evoked only by a direct inquiry made by General Johnston himself while *en route* to Manassas. And that there had been no "anxiety in Mr. Davis' mind lest there should be some unfortunate misunderstanding," etc., as General Johnston puts forward upon the professed authority of Mr. Davis' book, will appear from the true text of this page 348 of that book, which says the direct opposite, or specifically :

"General Johnston, by his promotion to the grade of General as well as his *superior rank as a brigadier* over Brigadier-General Beauregard, gave him precedence; so there was no need to ask which of the two would command the whole, when their troops should join and do duty together. Therefore *his inquiry*, as it was revolved in my mind, *created an anxiety not felt before*,¹ lest there should be some unfortunate complication or misunderstanding between these officers when their forces should be united."

Mr. Davis' significant despatch in reply to General Johnston (who does not give the full text) was as follows :

RICHMOND, July 20th, 1861.

General J. E. JOHNSTON,
Manassas Junction, Virginia :

You are a General in the Confederate Army, possessed of the power attaching to that rank. You will know how to make the exact knowledge of Brigadier-General Beauregard as well of the ground as of the troops

¹ Present italics.

and preparation avail for the success of the object in which you co-operate. The zeal of both assures me of harmonious action.

(Signed)

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

As for General Beauregard, nothing could have been farther from his thoughts and feelings than the least jealousy about rank, and nothing that he did, said, or wrote at or before the time looked toward any question so personal—his efforts being all directed to the one purpose of success in the fateful struggle at hand. And General Johnston's assertion that the President's telegram prevented what he (the President) "seems to have apprehended" is, to say the least, unjustifiable with respect to both Mr. Davis and General Beauregard—especially as General Johnston, while omitting to publish the whole of the telegram, refers to it in such manner as to leave his readers to suppose that it specially directed him to take control of the troops for the battle.

It may here be said that, although General Beauregard had been appointed a Brigadier-General in the Confederate service more than fifty days before General Johnston quitted the Federal army, and seventy-five days before he was made a Brigadier in the Confederate army, General Beauregard was aware that, all the same, General Johnston was his senior (not his junior, as the latter mis-asserts) by virtue of an Act of the Confederate Congress of March 14, 1861, which enacted :

“that in all cases of officers who have resigned, or who may, within six months, tender their resignation from the Army of the United States, and who have been or may be appointed to original vacancies in the Army of the Confederate States, the commissions issued shall bear one and the same date, so that the relative rank of officers of each grade should be determined by their former commission in the United States Army held anterior to the secession of the Confederate States from the United States.”

And so notorious, it must be said, was the tenor and purpose of this law among officers of the old army in the Confederate service, that it seems hardly credible that General Johnston could have found occasion to question Mr. Davis on the subject, from any doubt of General Beauregard's acknowledgment of his lawful right to the command of the two armies so soon as they should be concentrated upon the same field.¹ He must, therefore, have had some other object from that of eliciting

¹ General Johnston himself had an emphatic difference with President Davis, based on his claims made under that very Act. Five commissions of Brigadier-General in the Regular Army of the Confederate States being authorized by Act of Congress, they were issued respectively to Samuel Cooper, Joseph E. Johnston, A. S. Johnston, and R. E. Lee, in the order of their former seniority in the United States service, the fifth being left vacant. Previously and upon the organization of the Confederate Government at Montgomery, G. T. Beauregard had been commissioned as Brigadier-General in the Provisional Army, equivalent to Brigadier-General of Volunteers in the United States service ; so that, even had there been no law grading the commissions of Brigadier-General according to seniority in the old service, Brigadier-General Beauregard was nevertheless junior to Brigadier-General J. E. Johnston and to all the others, notwithstanding the earlier date of his commission, by the rule that, when two officers of equal titular grade

from the Confederate President a decision upon a point which the clear letter and spirit of the law had placed beyond dispute, wholly irrespective of his newly acquired grade of "General." His real reason for the inquiry may have been that, coming into General Beauregard's sphere of operations at this peculiar juncture of affairs and in pursuance of a plan of concentration urged by the latter, coming in fact to his "assistance" as his own report says, he inwardly felt that the immediate issue, whether for good or ill, should be left with General Beauregard, and supposed therefore that the military au-

meet, he of the Regular Army ranks him of the Provisional, Volunteer, or Militia service, irrespective of the dates of commissions.

The Act authorizing five commissions of Brigadier-General was amended some time prior to the battle of Manassas by striking out the word "Brigadier"—by virtue of which the grade of full General was created and commissions were issued to each of the former Brigadiers excepting Beauregard, who was unaffected by that amendment, as he bore no commission of Brigadier-General in the Regular Army of the Confederate States. The four senior commissions were dated, when issued, so as to rank their holders as follows : Samuel Cooper, A. S. Johnston, R. E. Lee, J. E. Johnston ;—whence sprung the controversy above mentioned between the latter and President Davis. The vacant fifth commission of General was conferred upon General Beauregard the day after, and bearing the date of, the victory of Manassas, as by the following letter :

MANASSAS, VA., July 21, 1861.

SIR :

Appreciating your services in the battle of Manassas and on several other occasions during the existing war, as affording the highest evidence of your skill as a commander, your gallantry as a soldier, and your zeal as a patriot, you are appointed to be General in the army of the Confederate States of America, and, with the consent of the Congress, will be duly commissioned accordingly.

Yours, &c.,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD.

thorities at Richmond might prefer he should so leave it, while he was naturally desirous that, after the immediate issue was fought, if events should retain the two armies on the same field after the battle he, as the senior in rank, should not, from such first conduct, stand in an uncertain position. At all events, such an inquiry shows a view of things on his part which was a consistent prelude to his course in leaving with General Beauregard the command for the battle ; a course, it may be said, in no wise inconsistent with the spirit of the telegram of the President to General Johnston already cited entire. The President's reply to General Johnston's inquiry refers him back to what he already knew—his rank ; and, so far as the additional part may be viewed as "establishing . . . our relative positions," it rather seems to suggest that General Johnston should be discreet instead of particular about that "position."

IV.

General Johnston in his *Century* article, apart from his personal point, has gone out of his way to venture in matter and words a very depreciatory criticism of General Beauregard's plans, also of his orders of battle, by means of several serious misrepresentations of their terms and by misstating also the position of the enemy. He has thereby but demonstrated one of alternative propositions, the more charitable of which is that he did not understand the orders he criticises,—as will be shown. But while exposing his attempted criticisms, it becomes pertinent and useful, in view of the personal question raised by him, that the artificial character of his account of that campaign and battle should be fully laid open.

His "Narrative" (pp. 33–57) is so constructed as to attract to himself even the credit of the strategy of concentration, which in fact proceeded from General Beauregard, while as to the execution of it General Johnston's part was consummated only with expressed hesitation. He says substantially that he and General Beauregard had promised to assist each

other, and that, in the emergency, he had marched to the latter's assistance. He had never promised any action of that design or character. At most, he had only promised that, if General Patterson, his adversary, should disregard the Shenandoah Valley for the purpose of co-operating with the forces in front of Washington against General Beauregard, he "might be able to throw from five thousand to six thousand men on his flank"¹;—a purely defensive operation and the least he could do unless he had stood with folded arms out of the contest.

General Beauregard, impressed with the necessity of providing for a timely concentration of the Confederate forces in order to take the offensive for a decisive result, had early communicated his views to the Confederate government.² In furtherance of the same object he had successively sent to General Johnston, in the month of June and again at the beginning of July, two of his volunteer aides, Governor Manning and Col. John S. Preston of South Carolina, to induce an understanding that, at the moment of the offensive movement upon himself then threatened from Washington, General Johnston would, if the government permitted, concentrate with him for the purpose of taking a vigorous offensive. General Beauregard had previously had the Blue Ridge roads and passes reconnoitred in order to facilitate the move-

¹ Appendixes C, D, E, F, J.

² Appendix G.

ment of the Army of the Shenandoah in his direction. But no encouragement was given to the purpose of these two important missions, of which, moreover, General Johnston omits all mention in his "Narrative."

On July 13th, the day before General Beauregard sent Colonel Chesnut of his staff to Richmond to propose such a concentration, for the purpose of taking the offensive successively against General McDowell and General Patterson, to be followed, after their defeat, by a march upon the rear of Washington, he wrote General Johnston to the same effect, but the latter gave no support whatever to the proposition.¹ Mention has already been made of his prolonged hesitation and discussion about attempting the concentration, even after General McDowell, on July 17th, had struck General Beauregard's outposts and was moving in full force upon Manassas, and although the government had ordered him to come, if practicable. He says ("Narrative," p. 33) that he promptly concurred in the proposed concentration, stating that he received the telegraphic order of the government about 1 A.M., of the 18th; omitting to state, however, that he had previously received, on the 17th, General Beauregard's telegraphic call, sent by the authority of the government, to which, moreover, he had replied on the 17th. He further says that he at once determined to attempt to defeat or

¹ Appendices H and I.

elude General Patterson, and march to General Beauregard's assistance. As the very sense of the strategic operation of General Beauregard was to effect a concentration of their whole strength against one of the enemy's separate forces, it was an extraordinary way for General Johnston to seek to accomplish this by attempting the very opposite—that is, as a fraction, to attack Patterson while General Beauregard, the other fraction, was sustaining the attack of McDowell. General Johnston reports his own force as then about 11,000 men, and Patterson's as 20,000.¹ If Patterson had defeated him, that would have ended the matter. But, if victory for General Johnston must have followed against such contemplated odds, the operation of defeating General Patterson would have taken at least a day, and the loss must have been very great; he must then have spent some time in reorganizing his command,—the requisites of which may be judged by his view that the victory of Manassas disorganized our forces more than defeat did the enemy; the subsequent marching of his exhausted troops must also have been very slow, since he complains greatly of it as contrasted with the march of regular troops, although he had not employed them in the defeat of Patterson.

¹ That is 9,000 men reinforced by three regiments (Johnston's "Narrative," pp 31 and 33) which then would average about 750 each. But that his adversary barely had at that time 10,000 effectives appears from "The Shenandoah Valley Campaign," by General Robert Patterson, p. 63.

It is easy, therefore, to see that, by the time General Johnston would have got to Manassas, if he had ever reached there at all, the battle of Manassas would already have passed into history.

But, in fact, instead of a ready assent to the proposed concentration, the telegraphic discussion expressing his doubt of its fitness was ended only upon an emphatic appeal by General Beauregard's Chief-of-Staff, in his name, to attempt the movement at all events without further delay. It appears, however, that about this time (July 18th) General Johnston ascertained that, on the *day previous*, General Patterson had already moved away to Charlestown, some twenty-three miles off,—that is to say, had executed upon him the very movement of which he doubted the feasibility on his own part—an important military action by General Patterson which should have been earlier known to General Johnston, and, as threatening General Beauregard, made it imperative that he should at least have held himself in the nearest and readiest position to concentrate with him upon a moment's notice, even without any order. As it stood, while General Johnston was doubting his ability to evade the enemy, the latter, on the 17th, was already far away from him at Charlestown, and was thus on the very edge of holding with McDowell the shorter lines. With proper concert on the part of the Federals, and but for General Beauregard's procuring the order

to General Johnston to come to Manassas, and following up that order with constant urging of him, the joint armies of Generals McDowell and Patterson might have crushed the Army of the Potomac, long before General Johnston would have thought of moving or could have arrived, and disposed of his army afterwards.

The plan General Beauregard had recommended—to gain a march upon Patterson—was fully practicable; and, even if the latter had been in a position to threaten General Johnston, it was the only military action, when the order was given, to be thought of. Even an avowed retreat towards General Beauregard, so as to maintain the interior lines, or even an independent defensive, were better at such a moment than to adventure a battle with Patterson (which General Johnston had not tried up to this forbidding moment), because, if, notwithstanding such an untoward situation, victory should still have favored General Beauregard's army, while sustaining General McDowell's attack upon the strategic position of Manassas, he would then have been free to go to General Johnston's support; and the Confederates would have been incurring but one risk of defeat instead of two. It was fortunate, therefore, that General Patterson had himself overreached General Johnston by so long a march (unutilized by the Federal direction), since, without the delay incurrible by the defeat of so great odds,—with nothing in fact to interfere,

and with railway transportation provided through General Beauregard, General Johnston, when he concluded to move, was only enabled, through McDowell's defeat in the Bull Run battle of the 18th and his consequent three days' check in General Beauregard's presence, to reach Manassas in time for the battle, some of his troops, which came, having arrived even towards the end of the conflict.

General Beauregard, in addition to his call by telegraph, had despatched one of his aides, Colonel A. R. Chisolm, to meet and inform General Johnston that railroad transportation would be accumulated for the transfer of his troops to Manassas, and to urge the utmost haste so that they might themselves attack and crush the Federal Army of the Potomac before General Patterson could arrive ; but, having reason to believe that the Shenandoah forces were somewhat greater than they really were, General Beauregard added, as an alternative recommendation, that General Johnston should himself march with a part of them by the way of Aldie (northwest of Manassas) and fall upon General McDowell's right flank and rear in the quarter of Centreville (about three miles distant from the centre and left of General Beauregard's position), while the latter, informed of the movement and in immediate readiness, would upon the sound of the conflict attack McDowell in front. General Johnston declined to act on this last rec-

ommendation by reason of difficulties as to means of transportation and the marching capacity of the troops.¹ In his "Narrative" (p. 38), however, General Johnston, speaking of this suggestion as though it were the only one conveyed by Colonel Chisolm, proceeds to say that he was averse to a plan involving two movements by different roads and the difficulty of calculating the arrival of undisciplined troops at any point, and that he preferred to join General Beauregard directly at Manassas by railroad transportation,—of which he then speaks as though secured by himself. But now, in his *Century* article, he says critically : (P. 105.)

"I rejected the plan, because such a one would enable an officer of ordinary sense and vigor to defeat our two armies one after the other. For McDowell, by his numerical superiority, could have disposed of my forces in less than two hours—that is to say, before Beauregard could have come up, when he also could have been defeated and the campaign ended."

Though it is a cardinal rule in war not to let the enemy get between your forces, lest he may defeat one fraction and turn upon the other, yet this, as every other rule of the Art, should yield to circumstances. It is in the discernment of such an occasion and the self-reliance to seize it that the soldier sometimes finds his vital opportunity. Such General Beauregard deemed this occasion and therefore

¹ General Beauregard's official report of the battle, Aug. 26, 1861.

made the recommendation, while at the same time sending to General Johnston for the transfer of all or part of his troops to Manassas—as he might decide—the accumulated railroad transportation which he himself (with the efficient aid of Mr. Edward C. Marshall, the President of the railroad) had foregathered, in anticipation of the assent of the Richmond authorities to the proposed concentration, and which General Johnston thus found ready to his hand, without any provision or effort of his own.

As to the proposed movement itself, events fully corroborated its correctness : roads in that season were at their very best ; the Shenandoah troops must have been somewhat inured to marching by their several marches and counter-marches in the Valley, and, if properly handled by their commander, must have been enabled to make the short march proposed in due season. There was but one movement of any length—General Johnston's own, as General Beauregard's forces and General McDowell's were as near as possible, without actual collision.

The plan was suggested in view of the general rawness of the Federal troops, the decisive advantages of a flank and rear attack, especially upon new troops, and as a surprise. The Federals, attacked in rear, would likely have supposed that General Beauregard had got upon their flank and had an overwhelming force. But if, instead,

they had recognized that General Johnston was upon them, the moral impression from a joint attack by both armies must have been far greater, or immediately fatal.

The suggestion, of course, did not have in view any such precise calculation as General Johnston made—that, if he had attempted this offensive, his forces would have been disposed of in less than two hours, or before the Army of the Potomac could have moved up to the attack. He gives his strength at 11,000 effectives (p. 27 above), and yet he informs us almost in the same breath that he intended the extraordinary attempt of defeating in its own chosen position Patterson's army, which he supposed to be 20,000 strong, and, after reorganizing his troops, of moving from Winchester to Manassas to assist General Beauregard in defeating McDowell; but that, if he had ventured to strike in rear McDowell's 35,000, with the concerted and expected co-operation of the Army of the Potomac, he would have been hopelessly disposed of in less than two hours. Either proposition might be correct, but both should not come from the same person. It must therefore be concluded that, while General Beauregard's plan proposed at the time was for a real offensive, General Johnston's proposition as to his intended attack of Patterson, though more sounding in statement, is but a fancy of narration; or, if his professed intention to attack Patterson was real, that his present criticism of

General Beauregard's proposition must be artificial,—either fact showing the unhistorical character of his writing.

The prolonged and stubborn resistance maintained against the greatly superior numbers of McDowell's flanking column by the fractional force of Evans, Bee, and Bartow on our left, during the early part of the battle of Manassas, affords, however, a positive refutation of General Johnston's fancy that his forces would have been disposed of in less than two hours if he had ventured the flank attack proposed by General Beauregard.¹ With such lieutenants as Jackson, Bee, Bartow, and Elzey, as also with the great advantage, as General Beauregard deemed it, of the offensive, particularly as between new troops, the Army of the Shenandoah, if the attack had been properly delivered, could have maintained itself quite two hours, or much longer if necessary,—especially when knowing that the Army of the Potomac, close at hand, was moving to strike the enemy in what would now have become its rear.

Neither had General Johnston any right to assume that it would have required even two hours for the Army of the Potomac to have begun its attack upon McDowell. Centreville, the Federal headquarters, where their supply and ammunition trains

¹ McDowell's flanking column, over 14,000 strong, was held at bay, he it remembered, for more than two hours by Evans, Bee, and Bartow, numbering not 4,000.

were assembled, was but three miles distant respectively from the Stone Bridge and Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords—the left and centre of General Beauregard's line—along Bull Run. Informed of General Johnston's approach, and alert therefore to his expected attack, the Army of the Potomac, pressing to the sound of the conflict, could easily, within an hour's time, have opened an artillery fire, announcing to both adversaries that it was entering into action. McDowell, who was looking to the line of Bull Run as the Confederate front, would have been at first compelled to make a change of front with enough troops to meet General Johnston's attack. It would, of course, have taken him some time to get into position, especially as his forces had no experience in such manœuvring. His first effort would have been resistance, which could only by degrees have been emboldened into attack, and only by degrees could all his forces have been brought into it. It surely lay with General Johnston himself, through the use of "ordinary skill," to so measure his attack as to gain a little time, if he thought it necessary, as an effective demonstration coming from such a quarter would have impressed great caution upon the Federal commander, not to speak of the effect upon his troops.

"Less than two hours" was an exceedingly short allowance of time for troops, circumstanced as General McDowell's were, to rout the Army of the Shenandoah. And the moment that General Beau-

regard's attack, even of artillery, would have opened from the other side—now the enemy's rear—the Federal army of new troops (unless composed of immortals or different from all other new armies and from what it proved to be in the battle that followed) would have been seized with alarm, accelerated to confusion and panic.

Even if General Johnston had been defeated, it could certainly have been only after a severe contest, which would have drawn General McDowell's army well out of shape, and the attack upon his rear, with the fresh and well organized lines of the Army of the Potomac, would have been doubly effective—all the more, indeed, if the Federals had pursued General Johnston, as their corps would have been thereby disorganized for a second immediate change of front and resistance against the Army of the Potomac, which would have been pressing upon their line of retreat, if not already in possession of it, as well as of their trains. It often happens in war that even veteran troops, in the immediate confusion of victory, are unable to withstand the attack of a fresh force even in front, not to speak of such an attack on their rear.¹

¹ Malplaquet, Hohenlinden, Arcola, Rivoli, Marengo, Castiglione, Eylau, and Kulm offer some of the examples of the effect of flank or rear attacks, even upon highly war-seasoned troops, their advantages being so great that even the exposure of a flank march by a corps detached from the immediate army is sometimes hazarded, as in some of the above instances; whereas, in the proposed movement by Aldie, no such exposure was incurred to reach the position for attack by General Johnston's independent force.

In point of fact the opportunity was one which, if seized and used with some boldness and even "ordinary vigor," would have yielded a brilliant success, as the plan, sound in its premises and all allowable adverse calculations, was fully approved by the events of the battle. But General Johnston, while in his calculations attributing to the raw hostile forces all that could be performed by a highly disciplined and well seasoned regular army, at the same time argued of our forces all the possible disabilities incidental to new volunteer troops. A general, however, cannot expect to have all the chances in his favor; while waiting for them, his adversary will be accomplishing his own plans, however clumsily conceived, thereby subordinating all movements to his own and gaining success by mere action. The history of war is full of buried feasibilities that might have been brilliant realities, if it were not for this "I dare not" waiting upon "I would."

Virtually the same movement thus declined by General Johnston was successfully executed by Stonewall Jackson one year later in co-operation with General Lee, resulting in the defeat of General McClellan in front of Richmond—a movement made in the face of all in all much greater relative difficulties and upon the rear of the then highly disciplined Federal Army of the Potomac; and the writer is confident that, if it had been proposed to Jackson as commander at

the time, he would have soon been on McDowell's rear.¹

It will be remembered, also, that in his letter to General Beauregard of June 21st, written through Major Whiting, General Johnston stated that, in case of the disappearance of the enemy from the quarter of the Shenandoah Valley and his concentration upon General Beauregard, he "might be able to throw 5,000 or 6,000 men on his flank"—² an operation that would, of course, have equally placed the enemy between the Confederate armies, not with a single army however, but with the concentrated forces of McDowell and Patterson; that is, General Johnston was disposed to try, after a tame defensive fashion (and with the certain result—if his criticism be true—that he would have been disposed of in much less than two hours), that which he shrank from attempting in a resolute offensive operation with a decisive result before us.

¹ The distance to be made by General Jackson in this operation was about three times that to be made by General Johnston, and he had to look out for the armies of Banks and McDowell—the one confronting him, and the other between him and McClellan.

² P. 25 above.

V.

General Johnston says (*Century*, p. 102) that, upon his arrival, "General Beauregard was then told" by him that we must attack the Federal army next morning so as to anticipate Patterson's arrival, as though the subject were new and he were thus filling a blank. As this was the very object which the strategy of concentration was intended to effect, and which General Beauregard had been urging upon General Johnston in various ways already mentioned, and very recently in his letter of July 13th, also in his immediate despatch of the 17th, and through the mission of Colonel Chisolm of his staff, this profession that "General Beauregard was then told" that we must attack McDowell next morning in anticipation of Patterson's arrival need not be characterized. Indeed certain information General Beauregard had received led him to determine that an attack that very afternoon might be favorably made, after General Johnston had arrived with some of his troops, and the latter assented to it. But as a subsequent inquiry and report did not bear out fully the data upon which it had seemed

advisable, General Beauregard was led to defer action till dawn of next day.

Indeed as soon as McDowell's offensive movement had begun, and before the concentration of General Johnston's forces with his had been granted, General Beauregard had determined to take the counter offensive the moment the movements of the enemy would allow it, and the following orders were issued by him accordingly in anticipation of the Federal offensive. For the understanding of them it must be stated that Bonham then held the advanced position of Fairfax Court-House, and the other commanders, excepting Ewell, were in rear of Bull Run.

HEAD-QUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MANASSAS JUNCTION, July 16, 1861.

{ SPECIAL ORDERS }
{ No. 120. }

The following will be observed and executed by all concerned in the special contingencies indicated :

I. Brigadier-General Longstreet will hold his brigade in readiness to march at a moment's notice and take position at Blackburn's Ford,—one regiment to be placed with two pieces of Walton's Battery in position in advance of that Ford carefully covered from the view of the enemy, the other two regiments remaining on this side of the Ford concealed from sight as far as practicable, but ready to be thrown across at any moment. And when General Longstreet shall hear the enemy engaged on his left at Mitchell's Ford he will move and attack him in the flank and rear, as already instructed, keeping communica-

tion open with Bonham's brigade on the left and Jones' brigade on the right.

II. Brigadier-General Jones will be prepared to move his brigade from Camp Walker simultaneously with the fourth brigade to positions at McLean's Ford corresponding with those to be occupied by Longstreet at Blackburn's Ford. As already instructed, he will advance thence to the attack of the enemy's flank on the Centreville road about half way between Centreville and Mitchell's Ford, maintaining communication with General Longstreet on his left and General Ewell on his right. Supported by a section of Walton's Battery, he will attack the enemy's line as nearly simultaneously with Longstreet's attack on the flank as practicable, but carefully guarding his own flank from a sudden attack by the enemy.

III. Brigadier-General Ewell, after falling back on or near Union Mills, will make all the necessary preparations for an attack of the enemy at Centreville.¹ His advance to that end, will commence as soon as he shall have ascertained that the advanced forces of the enemy have passed Centreville in pursuit of Bonham's brigade; and he will then move forward with prudence and necessary military precautions. He will receive information from these headquarters by signals or couriers as to the movements of the enemy. As already instructed, General Ewell will be careful to protect his right flank from an attack of the enemy in the direction of Fairfax Court-House or from Farris' Cross Roads. His movements will be supported by his cavalry and four pieces of Walton's Battery, and he will maintain communication on the left with General Jones at McLean's Ford.

IV. Simultaneously with the movements of the 3d and 4th brigades, Colonel Early will concentrate his brigade about half a mile in rear of Union Mills Ford and there

¹ See Appendix K.

hold himself in readiness to move in support of Ewell's brigade in the attack of the enemy at Centreville. Colonel Early will protect his rear with two pieces of Walton's Battery, which will be attached to his brigade in due time. He will leave an additional company to guard the Ford, which will be further protected by a piece of Walton's Battery.

V. Colonel Cocke, as soon as it is known that General Ewell has engaged the enemy, will advance his brigade supported by his cavalry and artillery and vigorously join in the attack at Centreville.

VI. General Bonham from his position at Mitchell's Ford will assume the offensive with spirit simultaneously with General Longstreet's attack on the enemy's flank and rear.

VII. In the event of the movements thus indicated the headquarters of the General commanding will be established at once at McLean's farmhouse.

By command of
Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD,
(Sgd.) THOMAS JORDAN,
A. A.-General.¹

¹ It is proper also to give here a pertinent part of an order which General Beauregard issued as early as the 8th of July, when the enemy's movement from Washington was threatened, to wit:

"Should the enemy march to the attack of Mitchell's Ford via Centreville, the following movements will be made with celerity:

"I. The 4th brigade will march from Blackburn's Ford to attack him on the flank and centre.

"II. The 3d brigade will be thrown to the attack of his centre and rear towards Centreville.

"III. The 2d and 6th brigades united will also push forward and attack him in the rear by way of Centreville, protecting their own right flanks and rear from the direction of Fairfax Station and Court-House.

"IV. In the event of the defeat of the enemy, the troops at Mitchell's Ford and Stone Bridge, especially the cavalry and artillery, will join in the pursuit, which will be conducted with vigor but unceasing prudence, and continued until he shall have been driven beyond the Potomac. ("War of the Rebellion, Off. Rec.," Series I., vol. ii., pp. 447, 448.) See Appendix L.

But when General Beauregard learned on the 18th that General Johnston would join him, he determined, of course, to await his arrival before taking the offensive. Yet, if the attack of the enemy in the action of the 18th had been sufficiently developed, he would have tried nevertheless then to execute his original offensive design.

General Johnston proceeds to say ("Narrative," p. 39) that General Beauregard showed him on a map the positions of his forces and those of the enemy, and significantly adds: "Unfortunately this "map only represented the roads and streams without expressing the configuration of the ground." The reader is thus left to surmise what misfortune weighed upon General Beauregard's army from the moment of General Johnston's arrival, because this map did not give him "the configuration," and what he might have done had it been otherwise. This grave disqualification of General Johnston to assume control of the forces (in addition to those already mentioned) left the situation the same, however, as though he had remained with the troops he had left behind him at Winchester and had sent the other forces (the essential desideratum) to General Beauregard who was quite familiar with the "configuration." These maps, of course, had been made for him not for General Johnston; and his time and that of his officers was too insufficient for their many exacting duties of preparation to permit any more work in maps as in other

things than he needed himself. It may be said, however, that those maps were far better than were available to a Confederate commander in almost any other campaign of the war, and he would have been highly pleased himself could he have entered upon any subsequent campaign with maps equally good. He had to depend most of the time upon a Colton pocket map or a railroad map, nor could he always get even that. What he could procure to be made of the country about Pittsburg Landing before the battle of Shiloh were but meagre sketches showing the watercourses and roads. It was only in the last year of the war that maps showing even the most salient features of the country were undertaken under the direction of the regular Engineer Department.

Having been attached (with Robert E. Lee and others of the United States Engineer Corps) to the staff of the Commander-in-chief, General Scott, in the Mexican War, General Beauregard had taken a leading part in the reconnaissances and conferences that had led and determined the marches and battles of that campaign ; and as to what was really essential in these respects to the commander of an army he had a practical military experience beyond any opportunities of General Johnston.

Speaking next of the distribution of the troops on Bull Run, General Johnston says (p. 40, "Narrative") that the main force was east of Mitchell's Ford to meet a movement upon that flank dis-

closed by spies. As this is an error, it may be taken in its order. Spies had determined nothing about it. Although General Beauregard's secret correspondence with Washington kept him very reliably informed of the enemy's main purpose, nothing had been learned of the plans considered at the Federal headquarters. His disposition of the troops was for the object of covering all the direct approaches to Manassas, while affording comparative facility for concentrating by means of interior lines upon either flank, and for the prompt assumption of the offensive, which was always, as already stated, a material element in his designs. In moving against the Confederate right flank, the enemy would safely cover his own communications, and from his intimate knowledge of the military tendencies, of General Scott (the Federal Commander-in-chief) General Beauregard believed that the Federal attack would probably be attempted in that quarter. Such, indeed, was the original intention.¹ Nevertheless the great advantage to the Federals of severing communications between the Army of the Potomac and that of the Shenandoah and of threatening the former's communications with Richmond by the Orange and Alexander Railroad, had led General Beauregard to anticipate that General McDowell might attempt to throw himself upon the Manassas Gap Railroad upon his left, as he had written to President Davis, July 11th²—a hazardous movement

¹ See McDowell's report.

² Appendix B.

however, which, if attempted, he hoped to turn fatally against the Federal commander. General Beauregard's own direct object was to draw the adversary into an encounter in the quarter of Mitchell's Ford (near Blackburn's Ford), and with that end in view he had issued the Special Order 100 (part of which is above given),¹ embracing the manner of retreat of his advanced forces when General McDowell's offensive movement should begin. This led to the encounter of the 18th on Bull Run, at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, in which the Federals were repulsed.

¹ See note, p. 42.

VI.

In his *Century* article General Johnston thus speaks of General Beauregard's plan of attack :

"General Beauregard then pointed out on a map of the neighborhood the roads leading to the enemy's camp at Centreville from the different parts of our line south of the stream, and the positions of the brigades near each road ; and a simple order of march, by which our troops would unite near the Federal position was sketched.

"Having had neither sleep nor recumbent rest since the morning of the 17th, I begged General Beauregard to put this order of march on paper, and have the necessary copies made and sent to me for inspection in a grove near where I expected to be resting ; this in time for distribution before night. This distribution was to be by him, the immediate Commander of most of the troops. Seeing that eight brigades were on the right of the line to Centreville, and but one to the left of it at a distance of four miles, I desired General Beauregard to have Bee's and Jackson's brigades placed in this interval near the detached brigade.

"The papers were brought to me a little before sunrise next morning. They differed greatly from the order sketched the day before ; but, as they would put the troops

in motion if distributed, it would be easy then to direct the course of each division. By the order sketched the day before, all our force would have been concentrated near Centreville, to attack the Federal army. By that prepared by General Beauregard but four brigades were directed "to the attack of Centreville," of which one and a half had not yet arrived from the Valley, while six brigades were to move forward to the Union Mills and Centreville road, there to hold themselves in readiness to support the attack on Centreville, or to move, two to Sangster's Cross-Roads, two to Fairfax Station, and two to Fairfax Court-House.

"The two and a half brigades on the ground, even supported by the half brigade of the reserve also on the ground, in all probability would have been defeated by the whole Federal army before the three bodies of two brigades each could have come to their aid, over distances of from three to five miles. Then, if the enemy had providentially been defeated by one sixth or one eighth of their number, Sangster's Cross-Roads and Fairfax Station were out of their line of retreat." (P. 102.)

As a first commentary upon the foregoing it is suggestive to give General Johnston's several detailed variants of the same matter. In his "Narrative" (p. 39) he has said :

"The position occupied by the Confederate army was too extensive, and the ground, much of it, too broken, thickly wooded, and intricate to be studied to any purpose in the brief space of time at my disposal. . . . General Beauregard pointed out, on his map, five roads converging to Centreville from different points of his front, and proposed an order of march on these roads, by

which the army should be concentrated near the Federal camps. It was accepted without hesitation, and, having had no opportunity to sleep in either of the three nights immediately preceding, I requested him to draw up this order of march, and have the number of copies necessary written by our staff-officers, and brought to me in time for distribution that evening, while I was preparing by rest for the impending battle.

"These papers were not ready for distribution that evening, nor until the next morning (21st), when I was able to sign them by the light of day in the grove where I had slept. They were not in the form usual in the United States Army, being written by General Beauregard's adjutant-general in his name, my sanction to be written on each copy. This was too immaterial to be worth correction; but, even if it had not been so, it was now too late to make such correction, for the troops should then have been in motion."

In his official Report he had originally related the matter in these words :

"I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th. . . . I found General Beauregard's position too extensive and the ground too densely wooded and intricate to be learned in the brief time at my disposal, and therefore determined to rely upon his knowledge of it and of the enemy's position. This I did readily, from full confidence in his capacity. . . .

"During the evening it was determined, instead of remaining in the defensive position then occupied, to assume the offensive, and attack the enemy before such a junction. General Beauregard proposed a plan of battle which I approved without hesitation. We drew up the

necessary orders during the night, which were approved formally by me at 4.30 o'clock on the morning of the 21st. The early movements of the enemy on that morning, and the non-arrival of the expected troops, prevented its execution.

"General Beauregard afterwards proposed a modification of the abandoned plan—to attack with our right while the left stood on the defensive. This, too, became impracticable, and a battle ensued, different in place and circumstances from any previous plan on our side." ("War of the Reb., Offi. Recs.," Series I., vol. ii., pp. 473, 474.)

It will be noticed how the serious difficulties standing between General Johnston and any assumption on his part to direct the forces so strongly marked in his Report disappear from his *Century* account, in which all points become obvious to him, and he recites himself as having assumed from the start a ready directing hand.

In his "Narrative" he says that General Beauregard submitted a plan of battle which he approved without hesitation,—apparently as an excuse for having approved a plan, the substantial features of which, he afterwards says, failed to go into effect, "perhaps fortunately" ("Narrative," p. 42),—an excuse based, however, upon an express inadvertence to this the all-vital matter, which was quite inconsistent with the pretence that he considered himself the responsible commander. General Beauregard's opportunities for sleep or rest—"recumbent" or otherwise,—threatened as

he was with a renewed attack at any moment, and annoyed by reports of almost constant alarms, had not for many days equalled General Johnston's; but, while the state of facts freed the latter to such uninterrupted leisure, General Beauregard continued his preparations for the conflict, to open within a few hours.

As to General Johnston's assertion that no other subordinate commander, except Longstreet, received the order of battle of July 20th, because no mention is made of it in their reports,¹ the vice of such a method of assertion should be apparent to him, because, if legitimate, it would discredit his own statement that, upon his arrival at Manassas, he issued a general order assuming command. That the order of march and battle was received by all the commanders immediately concerned in the offensive it directed against Centreville is too apparent from the action in conformity with it, not only of Longstreet, but of Jones and Ewell, as well as Holmes, to warrant General Johnston in his extraordinary assumption. Their receipt of this never was questioned for a moment. It was only the order to Ewell to begin the movement that miscarried.

Describing the position of General Beauregard's forces, it is significantly incorrect, on the part of General Johnston, to say that there were eight brigades on the right of the line to Centreville, and but one to the left, at a distance of four miles.

¹ *Century*, p. 102.

have made such a formation, probably, had he not greatly underestimated the strength of his enemy." ("Narrative," p. 57.)

While not stopping to question what the Federal general might have accomplished (in view of the unfortunate miscarriage of our own counter-attack), it is worth contrasting this new instance of the readiness with which General Johnston, in respect to a real conflict, assumes as certain all that might be done by an enemy, and distrusts the ability of our own forces to do as much or less—including the intended attack by our main line of battle upon the left flank of the enemy's weak advanced line in front of Bull Run and of their unsupported extreme left at Centreville, which he says did not go into effect "perhaps fortunately." While pleading that it was too late to substitute "Johnston" for "Beauregard" at the foot of the order, he does not hesitate to say that he was right in signing and sending out for distribution to the subordinate commanders this order directing them into alleged absurd and divergent marches, because it would have been easy when the troops were in motion to send them new orders and change their direction !

It is usual, unless an army by surprise finds itself suddenly forced into an engagement, that the chief subordinate commanders be instructed in the plan of battle through an order—and, if possible, personal instructions,—showing to each one not only his own movement, but that of every other, so that

all parts of action may intelligently correspond and co-operate. A proposition such as General Johnston's in respect to an order of march for battle can be nowhere found. How it would have worked, as respects the matter of time, with a new army whose fractions were once involved in a discordant march through the broken country and woods beyond Bull Run, can be easily imagined.

VII.

Those of the Shenandoah forces which, against their expected arrival in the night of the 20th, General Beauregard had appointed in the order of battle to the support of his extreme left, did not come; and meanwhile he received during the night reports, confirmed about sunrise, of movements of the enemy indicating their concentration in the vicinity of Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords, and also on the Warrenton turnpike, over whose stony bed the passage of their artillery was heard by the advanced posts.

These facts, together with the repulse of the Federals on the 18th in front of his centre at Blackburn's Ford, advised him that their effort would be made in front of his left centre at Mitchell's Ford and extreme left at the Stone Bridge.

He accordingly at 4:30 A.M. despatched orders to all the commands in the lines to be ready to move at a moment's notice, stating that he intended taking the offensive as soon as possible—that is, as soon as this supposed intention of the enemy would be sufficiently apparent.

At 5:30 A.M., Evans, who covered the Stone Bridge, reported to him that the enemy were deploying in his immediate front, throwing out skirmishers, and had opened an artillery fire. Deciding that the opportune moment had arrived for taking the offensive in the direction of Centreville with his right wing, while the left should stand on the defensive and hold its position to the last extremity, and explaining to General Johnston these new dispositions (in which he concurred), General Beauregard gave immediate orders for their execution. Ewell, Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham—the two former followed by their respective supports, Holmes and Early, in the second line—were to cross Bull Run, each brigade halting at a given advanced position until the brigade on its right should have come into line (as they had been instructed to do for execution of the original order of march),—that is, the forces were to pivot on Mitchell's Ford into position of attack, whence all were to advance in full line of battle between Union Mills and Mitchell's Fords upon the Federal forces between them and Centreville, turning their left rear at this point.

The plan was even wiser than he knew. Although he had a small post of observation at Sudley's Ford, three miles above the Stone Bridge, he expected that any attempt against his extreme left would be made against the Stone Bridge itself and its immediate vicinity, as Bull Run was passable at

that season at many places other than the numerous regular fords.

It would have required on the part of the Federal direction some little dash and boldness, but nothing more than was to be expected, even without the superiority of their powerful artillery ; while upon our part, a determined resistance, nerved by the excellent conduct of our troops in the repulse of the Federals on the 18th, was trusted by General Beauregard to defend the crossing sufficiently to allow time for our corps of attack to make their own offensive movement felt upon the enemy's line, the left of which, wherever found between Bull Run and Centreville, would have been taken in flank and rear. The resistance afterwards maintained by Evans, Bee, and Bartow to the entire Federal flanking column fully approved this opinion. But, instead of an attempt by the Federal army to cross at and near the Stone Bridge, it was divided into two forces, one of which, a column 14,000 strong, was detached in the early morning from the right of the Warrenton turnpike through a narrow, deep-cut road, hedged on both sides by a dense second-growth forest, over a distance of six miles up to Sudley Ford, where it was to cross, and thence march down on our left flank, while the remainder were distributed as follows : Schenck's brigade, in front of the Stone Bridge, and extending about half a mile below it ; Sherman's brigade, to the rear and right of Schenck, its left resting on

the Warrenton turnpike ; Keyes' brigade, still farther to the rear on the turnpike ; that is, Sherman and Keyes were disposed on the Warrenton turnpike between Stone Bridge and Cub Run ; Davies' brigade and Richardson's, united under the command of Davies, were thrown forward in front of Blackburn's Ford, and extending to the vicinity of McLean's Ford, thus isolated at a distance of about three miles from Schenck's, Sherman's, and Keyes' brigades, and from Blenker's brigade at Centreville.

By directing that detached column of 14,000 men through a defile of thick woods to Sudley Ford, the Federal commander had done what nothing but the happiest manœuvres on our part could have accomplished ; for he had thus cut his army in two and sent nearly the select half of it for several hours away from the field. Could General Beauregard have ordered the Federal tactics to assure the success of his own, it is evident he could not have chosen them better. It was not until a quarter to ten o'clock that the enemy's movement, made, as it happened, without any actual diversion, brought the advance of their flanking column into conflict with Evans, who, learning the movement, had himself marched beyond our left three quarters of a mile to meet it.

During the time of this circuitous march of the Federals, our line of battle from Mitchell's Ford to the extreme right at Union Mills Ford, should have been executing the offensive movement Gen-

eral Beauregard had ordered ; and the employment of so large a mass of the enemy's forces in the divergent operation by Sudley's Ford had so shortened the Federal line in our front that their left, (Richardson's brigade), only covered our line as far as the left of Jones' position at McLean's Ford, so that the enemy would have been decisively out-flanked by Jones, supported by Early, who were on Longstreet's right, not to speak of Ewell, supported by Holmes, who were on the right, of Jones and Early. The report of the Federal brigade commander, Richardson, shows his dread of being out-flanked by Jones' force, while the latter held his advanced position and stood awaiting the arrival of Ewell on his right, upon which the general forward movement in full line of battle was to begin.

In the face of such a movement, which should have begun at 7:30 o'clock at latest (the orders to attack having been sent at 5:30), the Federal left, Richardson, pressed in front by Longstreet and out-flanked by Jones, Early, Ewell, and Holmes, must have been instantly routed, exposing still more fatally the flank of Davies' brigade which must have dissolved in turn ; and Blenker's, under the full stress of the flight of these forces and the advance of superior numbers, would have been quickly stampeded. The continuing result would speedily have been that Schenck's, Sherman's, and Keyes' forces, demoralized by the unexpected sound of conflict on

their rear, and enveloped, must have been overcome and scattered or captured. It is but necessary to read fully the immediate Federal reports and chronicles of the day, or look to the actual rout that occurred under no such pressure either of numbers or position, to see at a glance what must have happened from such a formidable and happily related offensive movement, which even veteran troops could hardly have successfully withstood.

Meanwhile the Federal force of 14,000 men, engaged in marching through the forest defile and beyond, could not have been manœuvred so as to come back to the support of the isolated sections thus attacked; but they themselves, at the sound of this conflict in their rear, would in all probability have been struck with a panic, as they were later in the day, and, with their line of retreat cut off, would have been dispersed or captured. At all events, their flanking movement would have been discomfited and their defeat was certain.

But, General Ewell, not having received the final order sent him to advance, the remainder of the line of battle stood awaiting and expecting his coming up during these hours, and the general offensive movement ordered did not therefore go into effect; so that the Federal forces between Bull Run and the Warrenton turnpike, from the Stone Bridge to Centreville, were not attacked, and their flanking column made its long circuitous movement across upper Bull Run without molestation.

This is the plan, however, with such certain and decisive results, which General Johnston says failed to go into effect "perhaps fortunately." The writer cannot understand the birth of such a criticism except as in a mind so constitutionally adverse to taking the offensive as to sum up and approve all extreme possibilities that might disfavor one's self. General Johnston had shrunk from following General Beauregard's recommendation that he should march directly to the attack of McDowell's right flank and rear by the way of Aldie when coming to Manassas on the ground that, our forces being thus separated, McDowell would have destroyed his in less than two hours and General Beauregard's afterwards; yet when McDowell cuts his own army in two, isolating one part from the other by a defile, it is considered "fortunate" that General Beauregard's plan of attack, by which our forces must have struck in flank the exposed fraction, failed to go into effect, and that the enemy was meanwhile permitted to execute unmolested his own movement, which General Johnston extols as good strategy and the undiverted accomplishment of which was fraught with such danger to us.¹

¹ General Beauregard in his report thus expresses his own estimate of this plan for meeting General McDowell's apparent concentration against his left flank:

"In my opinion, the most effective method of relieving that flank was by a rapid, determined attack with my right wing and centre on the enemy's flank and rear at Centreville with due precautions against the advance of his reserves from the direction of Washington. By such a movement I confidently expected to achieve a complete victory by 12 M." See also letter to General Ewell, p. 117.

VIII.

General Johnston says (p. 102, *Century*) that, on the afternoon of his arrival, he desired General Beauregard to move the brigades of Generals Bee and Jackson to the left of Mitchell's Ford, and later, on the same page, he adds that, next morning,

"learning that Bee's and Jackson's brigades were still on the right, I again desired General Beauregard to transfer them to the left, which he did, giving the same orders to Hampton's Legion, which had just arrived."

When the Federal flanking movement succeeded in going into effect through the miscarriage of General Beauregard's orders to Ewell to advance to the attack, it happened that the presence of those troops (Bee's and Jackson's) near the left was handy and fortunate in that quarter; and the point of this statement by General Johnston is to give himself credit for prescient authorship of the service they actually rendered. He made no statement of this "desire" in his report, and his present assertion is incorrect. It can hardly be necessary to contradict

General Johnston on this point, as he is contradicted by the order of battle, approved by his own hand the next morning, according to which Bee and Jackson were assigned where General Beauregard placed them before General Johnston's arrival, at the centre and left centre (not "on the right"); that is to say, Bee's and Wilcox's brigades with Stuart's cavalry and Walton's Battery, were to form the reserve and "march via *Mitchell's Ford*, to be used according to circumstances," in the offensive movement against the Federal army; by the same order Bartow's brigade was to support Bonham's in the same movement from *Mitchell's Ford*, and Jackson's was to support Longstreet's (which was to the right of Bonham's) in the same movement, from Blackburn's Ford. That order also provided that Elzey's brigade should reinforce the left of the line, Cocke and Evans, who were to the left of Mitchell's Ford. And it was the failure of Elzey's brigade to arrive as expected during the night from the Shenandoah Valley and reinforce the left, together with the reported concentration of the enemy towards our left during the night, followed by his demonstration near the Stone Bridge and below it in the morning, that caused General Beauregard *then* to modify the general tactics for the battle, as the writer has already explained, and caused him, as a consequence, to shift Bee (that is the fractions of Bee's and

Bartow's brigades that had arrived) and Jackson toward the left.

The incidental relative statement that he "again desired" General Beauregard next morning to send Bee and Jackson to the left is as incorrect as the principal. When General Beauregard determined to issue these orders, in accordance with his general change of tactics and the shifting situation (because the due time allowable for Ewell and Holmes' longer march into position was passing away, and the main conflict was therefore imminent, while General Johnston's other promised forces—Elzey's, Wilcox's, and part of Bee's and Bartow's—were still not arriving), he informed General Johnston of his purpose, and the latter concurred in its propriety as he had in the main change, of which this was a consequence and part. Bartow and Hampton were then sent to the support of the Stone Bridge, and, as Bartow's full brigade had been assigned in the order of battle to the rear of Bonham, who now became stripped of support by this removal of Bee and Bartow, General Beauregard directed Jackson from Longstreet's rear, not to the left of the line, but at first to the rear of Bonham, at Mitchell's Ford, later, to the support of Cocke on Bonham's left, and later still he sent him orders to support either Bonham or Cocke, according to need; and it was from this position and in obedience to these orders that, upon the request of

Cocke, Jackson moved to the latter's support and encountered the enemy.¹

The movements of forces in the field are not all matter of pre-ordination, but controlled by circumstances ; and the above orders, instead of springing from abstract preconceptions fitted to unexpected accidents, were bethought and given in their timely order and only as the inflection of events advised.

¹ Jackson's "Rep. Reb. Recs.," Series I., vol. ii., p. 481.

IX.

After saying that he and General Beauregard joined the troops who were to make the general attack (which we have described as planned and ordered), General Johnston adds (p. 102, *Century*) that the brigades "at Mitchell's, Blackburn's, and McLean's Fords reported strong bodies of troops on the wooded heights before them. This *frustrated the second plan.*"¹

Indeed, nothing less than strong bodies of troops were expected to be encountered, stronger than really were there; and the writer leaves for the reader's reflection this extraordinary statement (the error of which, moreover, will circumstantially appear), that the "report" of "strong bodies of troops" frustrated this plan of attack.

¹ General Johnston's italics.

X.

General Johnston continues :

“ About eight o'clock, after receiving such information as scouts could give, I left General Beauregard near Longstreet's position, and placed myself on Lookout Hill in rear of Mitchell's Ford to await the development of the enemy's design. About nine o'clock the signal officer, Captain Alexander, reported that a column of Federal troops could be seen crossing the Valley of Bull Run, two miles beyond our left.” (*Century*, p. 102.)

After describing the long detour made by the Federal commander to Sudley Ford, his crossing Bull Run at that point to march down upon our left rear, Evans' change of front to the left and advance to meet the enemy, he continues :

“ General Beauregard had joined me on Lookout Hill, and we could distinctly hear the sounds and see the smoke of the fight. But they indicated no hostile force that Evans' troops and those of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson, which we could see hurrying towards the conflict in that order, were not adequate to resist.”

After further describing the conflict on the left, as maintained by Evans, reinforced by Bee and

Bartow, their final retreat and reinforcement by Hampton and Jackson at the point where the latter formed, he continues :

"In the meantime I had been waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design. The violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, but the large bodies of troops reported by chosen scouts to be facing our right kept me in doubt. But near eleven o'clock reports that those troops were felling trees showed that they were standing on the defensive; and new clouds of dust on the left proved that a large body of Federal troops was arriving on the field. It thus appeared that the enemy's great effort was to be against our left.

"I expressed this to General Beauregard, and the necessity of reinforcing the brigades engaged, and desired him to send immediate orders to Early and Holmes of the second line to hasten to the conflict with their brigades. General Bonham, who was near me, was desired to send up two regiments and a battery. I then set off at a rapid gallop to the scene of action, General Beauregard joining me without a word."¹

General Johnston's ignorance of the country, rendered further helpless by the "unfortunate" absence of the "configuration" on General Beauregard's map through which he was led to approve off-hand the latter's plan of attack, is now changed to an apparent detailed familiarity with localities to serve this new phase in his theoretical narrative.

¹ This latter sentence is specially commended to the readers appreciation.

General Beauregard's second plan of attack is "frustrated" by a "report" of "strong bodies of troops" *before 8 o'clock*, and after that hour up to *eleven*, General Johnston is "waiting with General Beauregard on Lookout Hill for evidence of General McDowell's design."

This is a strange proposition beside his assertion that upon his arrival the previous afternoon General Beauregard "was then told that as General Patterson would no doubt hasten to join General McDowell as soon as he discovered my movement, we must attack the Federal army next morning"; yet till within an hour of mid-day, he is waiting for evidence of the enemy's design; that is, standing on the passive defensive, and apparently might have so waited the remaining half of the day if the enemy, equally contemplative, had also waited for the evidence of our design. Apart from the main fact that such deliberate timidity of plan and express delay to grapple with the enemy would have jeopardized the whole strategy of the campaign effected with so much difficulty, it may be said that, excepting under special circumstances which did not exist here, a general who intends to attack cannot begin too early in the day, as he needs all the daylight he can get, not only to complete but to follow up and reap the benefits of victory.¹ General

¹ The apprehended advent of Patterson made our situation like that of the French army at Waterloo, only much more exposed, as there was no Grouchy left to fend off the Blucher. Military opinion has not exonerated Napoleon for delaying his attack until eleven o'clock, notwithstanding the difficulties offered by the ground from the heavy rainfall.

Beauregard's orders to attack, therefore, were issued to the forces by 5:30 A.M., after he had received full and reliable information that the enemy was in force on his left—a fact which, from the character of the country and the situation of the respective forces, quite sufficiently developed the enemy's "design" as to the part of our line he probably intended to attack, and any further "waiting" being mere passive submission to the execution of his plans.

As it would take some time for our troops to get into the required position of attack, and General Beauregard had still much to attend to at his headquarters at Manassas, it was not until near eight o'clock that he was able to set out for Mitchell's Ford, accompanied by General Johnston. And here it may be mentioned, as an incident significant in view of General Johnston's present architecture of narrative, that General Beauregard, in order to avoid the open road as they came within reach of the enemy's artillery fire, took the wood paths, and for a moment misled by their intricacy lost his way and rode into a pocket path followed by General Johnston; but, being familiar with the direction, he struck a straight line through the woods to the point he intended on the Mitchell's Ford road. Halting there for a few moments to send some directions to General Longstreet (he did not go near his position), General Beauregard pointed out to General Johnston the position he intended to occupy a short distance to the left of the road,

to which General Johnston thereupon went. And it was thus that he found himself at "Lookout Hill," in the rear of Mitchell's Ford, where General Beauregard immediately joined him after despatching a message.

General Beauregard took that position, however, for no such sedentary purpose as "waiting for evidence of General McDowell's design," but because it was best adapted for the observation and following up of the attack he had ordered, while affording convenient report of the progress of the enemy's apparent offensive against his left.

Here from about 8:30 till 10:30, while hearing the firing in the direction of the left near the Stone Bridge, the sound of attack from our own line of battle towards the right was awaited.

General Johnston says that from this point he and General Beauregard could see the troops of "Bee, Hampton, and Jackson hurrying towards the conflict in that order."

If by this is meant, what the context must convey, that the occurrences on the field were within his view and guidance, and that these troops could be seen as they successively went to the plateau where Bee, Hampton, and Jackson went into action, and where the battle was fought, it is a pregnant error. The hill occupied by the generals in rear of Mitchell's Ford was but a slight elevation, over three miles distant from the point in question, and so completely shut off by the intervening woods

and hills that they no more could or did see the movement of those troops from the positions assigned to them in the lines towards the left, and from which they hurried to the conflict, than if a stone wall had intervened. General Beauregard had sent General Bee to the immediate support of Evans' force at the Stone Bridge, which position was included in Cocke's command, and had also directed Jackson to the support of either Bonham or Cocke; at the latter's request Jackson later moved to the extreme left, and was opportunely at hand when needed, as already stated.

General Beauregard had also despatched Hampton to the same quarter. Evans, after perceiving the movement of the Federal flanking column, had led his force some three quarters of a mile beyond the extreme left, and formed at about right angles to the line of Bull Run, where he engaged the enemy. When he stood in need of help, Bee and Bartow crossed Young's Branch and joined him; and, when all three were overpowered, Hampton and Jackson also went to their support, remaining, however, on the plateau in rear of Young's Branch.

But these details were wholly unknown to Generals Johnston and Beauregard, either by observation or report. Dust (but no "smoke") was visible above the line of tree tops that horizoned their view; the sounds of firing also reached them, but Bee's and Bartow's movement to the rear of the extreme left, if visible to them, could have indicated,

together with the other signs, nothing but an accomplished movement of the enemy towards our left rear ; and, in that case, it would have been unpardonable not to have speeded the most competent special inquiry as to the exact condition of things and made immediate provision against the evident danger. It was an inadvertence (intelligible at that early day of imperfect organization, but in itself very serious) that the subordinate commanders at that end of the lines, whose forces thus became engaged in a lateral conflict, opposing so long a movement of the enemy towards our rear, sent in no report of that condition of affairs.

Neither General Johnston nor General Beauregard knew what force of the enemy was in rear of Bull Run, nor what particular forces of our own were in fact immediately opposed to them. They only knew that an attack was in progress against our left flank, which General Beauregard had ordered to hold out to the last extremity, while the forces on our right and centre should be executing the movement for the counter attack and seizing the enemy's line of communications ; and they were waiting in expectation of the sound of this attack, which would have turned the tables on the Federals, giving the Confederates their ammunition and subsistence trains, and effectually cutting off their retreat.

But General Johnston's account is constructed so as to assert that our plan of attack, having been frustrated before eight o'clock by the report from

chosen scouts of strong bodies of troops in front of our right, the forces were standing without active orders from that hour up to eleven, while he was waiting for evidence of the enemy's design, etc.

Now, the actual course of events at head-quarters, after Generals Johnston and Beauregard took position in rear of Mitchell's Ford, was as follows: General Beauregard had sent the signal officer (Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General, E. P. Alexander, an accomplished officer of his army) to Wilcoxen's Hill with couriers to observe and report to him. Captain Alexander sent General Beauregard two despatches (*written*, as were all his despatches to head-quarters in the field, not *signalled*), importing that forces of the enemy were crossing the Run at different points. Later he came to General Beauregard in person, and pointed out a column of dust, which by this time had risen so high as to be visible above the trees from our position. General Beauregard thereupon despatched Captain W. H. Stevens, of the Engineers, to the extreme left, provided with couriers and with orders to send him a report of the condition of affairs every ten minutes.

Meanwhile, and before any such report came from the left (General Johnston being immediately present and a witness of ear and sight), General Beauregard received from General Jones, by Captain Terry, of Texas, a despatch stating that he had been in position all along waiting for General Ewell's force to come up on his right and begin the offen-

sive movement, as ordered, upon Centreville, but that Ewell had not come into position. General Beauregard immediately despatched Captain Terry to Ewell with an order to hasten forward. Soon, however, the firing on the left increased sensibly, and General Johnston said that, as matters seemed to be growing serious in that quarter, he thought he had better go there. He proposed nothing more than this, the usefulness of his immediate personal presence with the troops there engaged, while General Beauregard remained in rear of Mitchell's Ford directing our own offensive movement which he had just re-urged upon Ewell. General Beauregard thought it a very useful thing for General Johnston to do, but in a few moments, and before the latter started, a despatch came to General Beauregard from General Ewell himself, showing that he was not merely delayed on the way, but that, not having received the final order to move to the attack, he had been at a stand in his original position awaiting it.

This news altered the whole aspect of the question to General Beauregard, who, from his knowledge of the country to be covered, thought it now unlikely that the troops would be able to get into position in time to make their attack felt on the right so as to co-operate decisively with the defensive action by such troops as were then on the left, and, expressing this consideration to General Johnston, said that the attack which had just then been

re-urged by order to General Ewell (to move into position with the advanced line that was waiting for him) should be abandoned altogether, and that all available reinforcements should be hastened to the left so as to fight the battle out in that quarter. General Johnston, stating that he could give no positive advice on the subject on account of his not understanding the country and knowing but little of the location of the troops, expressed his agreement with General Beauregard's opinion, though giving him for what it was worth.

"Felling trees in our front," referred to by General Johnston as indicating that the enemy there was standing on the defensive, had nothing to do with the matter ; its only just influence, of course, as an indication of weakness, could have been to incite us to pursue our offensive flanking movement in that quarter, if that had been in course of execution. Up to the moment of receiving General Ewell's despatch that he had not even begun his movement, it was supposed at head-quarters that this offensive movement ordered on our right was being carried out ; and, if such had been the fact, the troops on the right, including even Early, could not have been re-called for any practical effect depending on their arriving on the extreme left. Their only, as well as their best service, in that case, would have been to strike all the more vigorously the enemy's weaker defensive wing in front of them, the extreme left of which in point of fact but covered

Longstreet's front on the right of Blackburn's Ford, leaving uncovered Jones' force on the right of Longstreet. Standing, as the Federals there were, on the defensive, and finding themselves attacked on their flank and rear by Jones, Early, Ewell, and Holmes, and in front by Longstreet and Bonham, their rout would have been immediate and have quickly spread to the other forces on both sides of the Run. And it was the report of this failure of orders to reach General Ewell, his consequent total failure to move into position of attack, and the too great time it would take in the juncture to repair this delay on account of the character of the country and the location of the troops, coupled with the Federal attack already under way on our left, that caused this modification of tactics.¹

General Beauregard thereupon ordered General Bonham,² who was at hand, to send to the left two regiments and a battery (Kershaw's and Cash's regiments with Kemper's Battery were sent), and

¹ In a letter to General Early in 1867, General Johnston says: "He (Beauregard) proposed a plan of attack which I accepted. It was defeated, however, by the appearance of Tyler's troops near the Stone Bridge soon after sunrise. He then proposed to stand on the defensive there and continue the offensive with the troops on the right of the road from Manassas to Centreville. This was frustrated by the movement which turned Cocke and Evans . . ."

This was between 10:30 and 11 A.M. as the evidence of it reached us—a very different thing from its being frustrated before or after 8 o'clock by the "report of a strong body of troops" in front of our right, as General Johnston now controversially asserts.

See letter to General Ewell, July 26, 1861, p. 117.

² Bonham's report, "Reb. Recs.," Series I., vol. ii., p. 519.

despatched orders to Holmes and Early to move to the same quarter, and to Jones and Ewell to resume their former position. But, considering it also necessary to maintain a strong demonstration along our position in front of the Run so as to detain the enemy there, he gave, before setting out for the left, directions to this effect to Bonham, Longstreet, Jones, and Ewell. After he had despatched these orders, General Johnston and he set out together for the scene of engagement.¹

In his official report of the battle General Beauregard relates this change of tactics as made with General Johnston's "sanction," studiously maintaining here, as elsewhere, that reserve and deference which military men will understand as due from the junior to the senior officer present, and toning statements down to the least self-expression consistent with the facts.

It may now be said, in view of General Johnston's subsequent methods of war, that, if he had been exercising the command at the time and charged with the responsibility of solving the exigency, he would, instead of resolving to fight out the battle on the left to maintain the position of Manassas, have probably then issued an order to the army to fall back behind the Rappahannock.

¹ Mr. Spratt, correspondent of the *Charleston Mercury*, says in his report at the time that he saw and heard General Beauregard (in rear of Mitchell's Ford) pointing to the left, saying: "There is the battle ground," and Beauregard and Johnston rode swiftly to the left.—Moore's "Reb. Rec.," vol. ii., Index, Bull Run.

General Johnston in his report had here said :

“ About 11 o'clock the violence of the firing on the left indicated a battle, and the march of a large body of troops from the enemy's centre towards the conflict was shown by clouds of dust. I was thus convinced that his great effort was to be made with his right. I stated that conviction to General Beauregard and the absolute necessity of immediately strengthening our left as much as possible.”

The language of this passage was noticed by General Beauregard at the time as, though being literally true so far as it gave General Johnston's opinion as expressed in concurrence with that of General Beauregard as above related, yet bearing an incorrect suggestion. But he was very grateful for the coming of the Shenandoah force to his assistance, and his feelings were averse to the least thing that might raise a coldness between him and General Johnston. The facts had been so clearly stated in his report, which, though he was the junior, was not questioned by his senior, whose duty it was to do so immediately after reading it, and, moreover, the substantial facts themselves were so notorious that it might have seemed a pruriency to have raised under such conditions any contentious question.

XI.

General Johnston continues (*Century*, p. 104):

"It now seemed that a battle was to be fought entirely different in place and circumstances from the two plans previously adopted and abandoned as impracticable. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line, we were compelled to fight on the defensive more than a mile in rear of that line and at right angles to it on a field selected by General Bee, with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle.

"While we were riding forward General Beauregard suggested to me to assign him to the immediate command of the troops engaged, so that my supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted, to which I assented. So he commanded those troops under me, as elsewhere lieutenant-generals commanded corps and major-generals divisions under me. . . .

"After the troops were in good battle order, I turned to the supervision of the whole field."

In his "Narrative" General Johnston had thus treated the same phase :

"It was now evident that a battle was to be fought entirely different, in place and circumstances, from either of the two plans previously adopted. Events just related

had prevented us from attacking the Federal army near Centreville; or, later, engaging it between that place and Bull Run, according to the second plan, suggested by General Beauregard. Instead of taking the initiative and operating in front of our line, we were now compelled to fight on the defensive, a mile and a half behind that line, and at right angles to it, on a new and unsurveyed field, with no other plans than those suggested by the changing events of battle. As soon as the necessary orders had been despatched I set out at a rapid gallop, accompanied by General Beauregard, to give such aid as we could to our troops engaged four miles off. . . .

"After assigning General Beauregard to the command of the troops immediately engaged, which he properly suggested belonged to the second in rank, not to the Commander of the Army, I returned to the supervision of the whole field."—(Pp. 47-49.)

In his Report he had said that General Beauregard "claimed" it as the "younger officer," which is by no means the same thing.

He has also written in a letter to General Early, that the battle was now to be fought "on a field with which General Beauregard and myself (himself) were *equally unacquainted*."¹

It is of no consequence how many lieutenant-generals or major-generals either he or General Beauregard afterwards commanded "elsewhere"; but, in speaking of this field where the battle was now to be fought as a "new and *unsurveyed* field," General Johnston evidently seeks to remove one

¹ Same letter as above, p. 86.

of his comparative disabilities, and place General Beauregard now in that respect on the same level with himself, thus striking away one of the chief apparent grounds why he had waived the command, or, at least, according to his necessary confession, had been compelled, up to this time, to follow General Beauregard's plans as to the tactics of the battle.

The introduction of such an assertion, with its implications, but shows that General Johnston, yielding to the pressure of his own consciousness, seized it as an argument to convey that thenceforth, at all events, he exercised the command. To a keen reader the very use of the argument is in itself akin to confession that the command had originally been left with General Beauregard, while the argument itself falls from the incorrectness of the assertion on which it is built.

It will be noticed that this presumptuous statement, that General Beauregard was equally ignorant with himself of the country that had lain so long upon his left hand (or, as General Johnston technically phrases it in his "Narrative," that this "new" field was "*unsurveyed*"), discreetly does not appear in any form in his later *Century* version, notwithstanding the latter's overreaching controversialism.

The fact is that General Beauregard had caused a thorough reconnaissance to be made not only of the country in his front, in many parts even close

up to the Potomac, but for several miles on his right and left,—the reconnoissance in the latter quarter having been made by Captain D. B. Harris of the engineers, one of the ablest soldiers in the Confederate service ; and General Beauregard himself had at least twice personally examined this same country, stretching upon the left of his lines, upon which the battle was fought.

Now the point as to the command had been fixed upon General Johnston's arrival, as explicitly stated in General Beauregard's official report. The plan of battle was to attack, and was to be executed, as that report says, "under my [Gen. Beauregard's] command." He was therefore in command for the battle. And as a commander must always be free to advance, attack, defend, or manœuvre, according to the shifting favor or stress of the day, he was—as a matter of military common-sense—in command for all the purposes and exigencies of the battle, to strike or defend whenever and wherever necessary. Therefore, when the exigencies arose that caused us—instead of attacking on our right and centre and defending on our left—to stand on our right and centre and fight on our left, General Beauregard continued to exercise the command, and General Johnston performed, at his suggestion and request and at the post indicated by him, the service for which he most needed his assistance. The reasons which determined the command in the beginning were now intensified, as General Johnston

knew nothing of this "new field" beyond and in rear of our left, even from maps without "the configuration," and the responsibility at that moment was a much more serious matter than before.

Neither when riding forward to this new field (as General Johnston has it in his *Century* article), nor after the rallying of the troops which were found broken there by McDowell's attack (as he has it in his "Narrative"), did General Beauregard request him to assign him to the command of the troops engaged, or "so that my [General Johnston's] supervision of the whole field might not be interrupted"; nor did General Beauregard "suggest" that the position belonged to him as "the second in rank," as General Johnston has it in his "Narrative."

After the troops engaged had been rallied, General Beauregard felt that it was of immediate vital importance that either General Johnston or himself should go to a proper point in the rear, so as to hurry forward and give direction to the march of all the reinforcements which had been ordered up from the right and centre of the Bull Run lines. This was the service which General Beauregard expressly requested him to go and perform, while he himself should remain in command of the field¹; and he "claimed" this position for the reason given at the time in his letter to Stonewall Jackson above cited, that he was "responsible for the success or

¹ General Beauregard's Report.

failure of the battle," the only reason that would have permitted him to "claim" any thing.

General Johnston was unwilling to go. General Beauregard told him, however, that one of them must go immediately upon this service, and that, under the circumstances, he considered it properly his place to do so. General Johnston then consented, and went to the Lewis House, which General Beauregard, in view of the route that he knew would be taken by the marching forces, had proposed as the proper post for him to take. It is quite possible that, in the anxious endeavor General Beauregard was making at that moment to get General Johnston to go where he might be most useful, he may also have made the personal remark that, as he was the "younger," he should remain at the exposed position, but nothing was thought or said about juniorship in rank or as an officer. In the position to which General Johnston thus went he rendered vital service, duly acknowledged in General Beauregard's report as follows :

"From that position, by his energy and sagacity, his keen perception and anticipation of my needs, he so directed the reserves as to insure the success of the day." ("Rebel Records," vol. ii., p. 492.) "From his services on the field as we entered it together, as already mentioned, and his subsequent watchful management of the reinforcements as they reached the vicinity of the field, our countrymen may draw the most auspicious auguries." (*Ib.*)

Had General Beauregard's Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Jordan, been on the field with him instead of General Johnston, he would have sent him to perform that same duty, as, under the circumstances, he would have ordered General Johnston to it, had the latter been his junior.

Any thoughtful, even though not professional, military reader will see that this position, "claimed" and retained by General Beauregard, was the true one for the responsible commander.

It was the command of the line of battle, then fatally engaged, upon the direction of which primarily depended the success of the day; whereas the service which General Johnston went to perform, at General Beauregard's indication and request, was in reality that of a chief-of-staff.

Apart from Smith's and Hunton's regiments from Cocke's brigade, near the Stone Bridge, which General Beauregard immediately ordered up from Bull Run and into position on the field, the other reinforcements, those which General Johnston went back to urge forward, were mostly several miles to the rear of the field, and none arrived there for fully two hours, during which time General Johnston performed no part that even affected the active contest on the field. As to the supervision of the country below (call it field or not), it was a very secondary matter.

The writer does not believe that military annals will furnish an instance, in similar circumstances,

where the actual commander ever left the command of the line of battle to go back upon such a service as that which General Johnston went to perform at his request.

If the position taken by General Johnston at the Lewis House was the true one for the responsible commander, he should have gone thither without General Beauregard's requesting it, or, at least, without his insisting to the extent of the alternative that either one or the other of them must go. But if the position General Johnston thus left to General Beauregard, when reluctantly going to perform that service, was the post for the responsible commander, he, if such, should have kept it for himself.

The reader, moreover, will recall how, in speaking of the modification of tactics by which our forces were ordered towards the extreme left, General Johnston emphasizes in his "Narrative" that a battle was now to take place on a "new and unsurveyed field," etc., at right angles to the line of Bull Run and "a mile and a half" in rear of that line, thus pointedly locating the battle on a distinct field unfamiliar to General Beauregard and remote from the one they had occupied, with which latter alone General Beauregard is represented as being acquainted. But, in meeting the fact that General Beauregard was left in command of this very new field where he had said "the battle" was to take place, General Johnston states that, in going to the

rear (that is, to the Lewis House to perform the service which General Beauregard had requested of him), he "turned to the supervision of the whole field." So that what for a purpose he had just emphasized as a new and remote field now becomes a mere part of the original field which he goes away from the battle to "supervise;" it having been moreover already understood by the reader that the enemy, on most of the remaining part of this "whole field" was standing on an intrenched defensive behind fallen trees, and that, before leaving Mitchell's Ford, General Beauregard had ordered away from there and up to the "new field," the bulk of the forces in those lines.

This is another instance of two contrary propositions on the same point emanating from the same authority—a feature intensified by a re-inversion of the same proposition when General Johnston comes to enumerate the forces "on the field."

Apparently to remove, as to his real question (that of the command), the weight of the fact that the great bulk of the forces present to fight the battle were General Beauregard's, he says (p. 105, *Century*): "On our side the army of the Shenandoah had on the field [meaning the battle-field] 8,000 men,¹ that of the Potomac, as reported, 9,477 men,"—thus excluding as not "on the field" some

¹ Three thousand of these—Kirby Smith's (Elzey's) forces—arrived on the field at about 3:30 P.M. from Manassas Station, having come that day by railroad from the Shenandoah Valley.

ten thousand of the Army of the Potomac, who occupied in the Bull Run lines the remainder of this "whole field," which, having served its intermediate purpose, is now dropped a second time, and becomes no part of "the field."

There was but one battle-field—where General Beauregard commanded. And those very troops of the Army of the Shenandoah "on the field" (Bee's, Bartow's, and Jackson's) fought there under his immediate command, while General Johnston was in the rear at the Lewis House,—as did Elzey's force (of General Johnston's troops), which the latter directed from the Lewis House to the field, where they were led into proper position by Captain D. B. Harris, of General Beauregard's staff, and as did the troops of General Beauregard's own army, which he had ordered up from the lower lines, and which General Johnston directed forward from the Lewis House.

After the rout of the enemy, when General Beauregard, having ordered in pursuit all the forces on the field, went to the Lewis House to turn over the command to General Johnston, as the battle was ended, he found Holmes' and Ewell's forces, who had reached that point from the extreme right, held there by General Johnston at ordered arms, instead of being sent forward upon the retreating enemy on the Warrenton turnpike so as to cut them off and capture them.

General Johnston speaks of the order to the regiments of Cocke's brigade, by which they were moved up from Bull Run to the field, and of their employment there, in such a way that the reader would consider such orders and employment to have been from him and under his eye and direction. Though he may have sent orders to those regiments to repair to the immediate battle-field, General Beauregard had already anticipated the propriety of their presence in that quarter, and it was immediately from his orders that they came upon the field, where they received from him their positions and service in the line of battle, which he was arranging to meet the dispositions of the Federal forces then pressing their attack.

In the same vein of personal narrative implying immediate presence and view, General Johnston speaks of a number of phases of the battle, including the "formidable aspect" presented by the Federal lines as they were rallied and formed for a last attack on the ground across the valley of Young's Branch. That ground was a mile and a half from his post, and completely shut off from any view of his by the intervening plateau and woods in rear of the Warrenton turnpike, along which General Beauregard's line of battle was arranged, and from which eminence the entire action of the Federals was open to the latter's view—the range of arms of that day being

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such as to bring the hostile forces into close opposition.

It is due no doubt to General Johnston's remote and viewless position that he makes also the serious error of describing the battle as involving but one repulse of the enemy, instead of several, from the field held by our forces.

XII.

For correctness' sake the following may be noticed (page 104, *Century*):

"A report received about two o'clock from General Beauregard's office¹ that another United States army was approaching from the northwest, and but a few miles from us, caused me to send orders to Bonham, Longstreet, and Jones to hold their brigades south of Bull Run, and ready to move."

General Beauregard's Chief-of-Staff, General Jordan, who had remained in charge at Manassas, in order to provide for the despatch to the field of all reinforcements arriving by railroad, informs him that no such despatch was sent from the office there to General Johnston. But the following despatch was sent to General Beauregard himself by the signal officer, Captain Alexander, from Wilcoxon's Hill. It reached him on the battle-field, *via* the Lewis House, at 3 P.M.

¹ That is, at Manassas R.R. Station.

WILCOXEN'S HILL, 1:15 P.M.

Large reinforcements are pushing towards the enemy crossing Bull Run far above Stone Bridge.

The column of dust which has come down from toward the mountains is going straight toward Manassas Station. It now appears about three miles from the Junction. Another column is visible in the far distance toward Paris.

E. P. ALEXANDER,
Capt. Engrs.

Six pieces in battery at Butler's House, Centreville Road.

General BEAUREGARD,
Lewis House.

Rec'd at 3 h. P.M.

The first part of this despatch probably refers to Howard's (Federal) brigade.

On account of the further information it contained respecting an apparent movement toward Manassas Railroad Station, General Beauregard, as he had the immediate conduct of the battle on his hands, sent it to the Lewis House for the information of General Johnston, whose station in the country behind made him the proper judge of its value as well as able to use the lower Bull Run forces to meet it, if it were verified.

XIII.

At page 106 of his *Century* article, General Johnston says :

“ In an account of the battle published in the November number of the *Century*, General Beauregard mentions offensive operations he ‘ had designed and ordered against his (adversary’s) left flank and rear at Centreville,’ and censures my friend R. S. Ewell, for their failure. At the time referred to, three of the four Federal divisions were near Bull Run, above the turnpike, and the fourth facing our right, so that troops of ours going to Centreville then, if not prevented by the Federal division facing them, would have found no enemy. And General Ewell was not, as he reports, ‘ instructed in the plan of attack,’ for he says in his official report : ‘ I first received orders to hold myself in readiness to advance at a moment’s notice. I next received a copy of an order sent to me by General Jones, in which it was stated that I had been ordered to his support.’ Three other contradictory orders, he says, followed.

“ As to the comparison with Desaix at Marengo, made by General Beauregard, the circumstances had no resemblance. Desaix was separated from the French army, heard the sounds of battle, knew that he was wanted there, and went there.

"General Ewell knew that a battle was raging; but knew, too, that all the unengaged brigades were between him and it, and his commander was near enough to give him orders. But he had no reason to suppose that his commander desired him to move to Centreville, where there was then no enemy. There could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville."

The writer believes he is authorized in thinking that the above commingling of matter with the issue proceeds from a desire on the part of General Johnston to canvass for his own personal pretensions borne upon his article the favor of some over-sensitive friends of General Ewell. The writer has no reason to believe that he was exceeded by General Johnston in regard for General Ewell—his esteem for whom as a man and a soldier he showed, not only while that officer was under his command, but even after the war,—presenting him as a special token of that esteem with a cane made from a fragment of a staff that held the flag of Fort Sumter during the siege of Charleston.

General Beauregard did not censure him, and it is unfair to say so. In speaking of the miscarriage of his second plan of attack—which occurred because General Ewell, who failed to receive his own personal order to advance, did not come into position on the right and thus kept the whole line of battle waiting several hours until McDowell's circuitous flanking movement on our left had been,

without diversion, accomplished,—he stated expressly that he had exonerated him. He added—by way of commentary such as any military writer might have made—that General Ewell should have marched when he received from General Jones a communication of the order sent to that officer to go forward into position (which stated that General Ewell himself had been already ordered to take the offensive), as set forth in General Jones' official report. General Beauregard compared it—as a case where individual discretion might act without respect to official personal orders—with that of Desaix at Marengo, and surmised that, if Stonewall Jackson had been there, the movement would not have balked—that is to say, that he would upon that evidence either have moved up to his position in the line of attack or promptly cleared the matter up with General Jones.

Desaix, though young, had had great experience, and Jackson's typical enterprise and self-reliance beg no showing. While these allusions, therefore, helped to illustrate the military reflection which the writer was making upon the desired course of events, he cannot see that they were a censure of General Ewell.

General Johnston says there was no resemblance between the cases of Ewell and Desaix, and proceeds to enumerate his critical traits of difference, to which—for their point—he might have added that Desaix and Ewell did not wear hats of like shape

or ride horses of the same color. It was a principle of action that the writer was illustrating, which may and should be the same through all the necessary variety of facts that will yield evidence for action in each separate case, whether it be the sound of a gun or the testimony of an order received and communicated by a fellow-officer.

The remainder of General Johnston's observations on this point are easily disposed of.

Apart from the instructions in the general order of battle, which, in respect to the movement against the line of the Warrenton turnpike and Centreville, remained unmodified as to all the commands on the right of Mitchell's Ford, including Ewell's (those only to the left of that ford being ordered at 5:30 A.M. to stand on the defensive), each brigade commander had been personally instructed by General Beauregard in the manner and purpose of that movement. Moreover, the first detailed order to Ewell that morning was not "to hold himself in readiness to move at a moment's notice," but to hold himself in readiness to "*take the offensive* on Centreville at a moment's notice," and as a part of a common offensive movement. This order, sent at 5:30 A.M., was duly received by him, and General Johnston had easy reference to it.

Nothing further remained to be given, therefore, than the word to move, which was to be expected "as soon as possible."

¹ See order, p. 113.

General Ewell in his report adds that he next received a copy of an order sent to General Jones, in which it was stated that he had been ordered to Jones' support. This is not the exact rendering of the order contained in General Jones' note to Ewell.¹ General Ewell does not say that "three other contradictory orders" were received by him as General Johnston ventures to assert, manifestly with the object of fathering upon that worthy officer an official criticism of General Beauregard's orders of which he was incapable. And this he does, blind in this as in other things, that it really carries an implied contradiction of his main assertion that he was exercising the command. These directions impugned by General Johnston as "contradictory orders" were issued by General Beauregard while they were together at their station in the rear of Mitchell's Ford and with General Johnston's knowledge. If he was in command, they were his own "contradictory orders," but he criticises them as General Beauregard's, and unconsciously proves that he was not exercising command.

The first of these orders was upon receipt of the despatch from General Jones informing General Beauregard that he had been in position all morning waiting for General Ewell; General Beauregard thereupon sent to Ewell an order to advance immediately according to his original instructions. Meanwhile the firing and dust on the extreme left had

¹ See order, p. 114.

increased, Ewell's failure to advance became known, and an order was sent to Ewell as well as Jones to resume their former positions. But before General Beauregard set out for the extreme left they were directed by him to advance and maintain a strong demonstration in that quarter, their respective supports, Holmes and Early, being at the same time ordered to march to the extreme left, where the battle was going on.

Contradictory orders are such as involve simultaneous opposites or inconsistency. General Beauregard's were successive orders, and no more contradictory than are any two or more successive orders to suit the changing circumstances of a battle. They were issued by him with General Johnston present; they controlled the action of the divisions of the army in the crisis of the day, and General Johnston's criticism suppresses his claim that he was exercising the command.

During the time that General Ewell should have moved up into position on the right of General Jones (assuming that the latter had sufficiently warned him) and our line of battle should have been attacking the enemy, Ewell did not know that a battle was "raging" at the other end of the line. It did not begin to "rage" until the attack by the advance of McDowell's flanking column under Burnside, which opened at a quarter to ten (General Beauregard's report; Colonel Burnside's report). Whether raging or not, there was no

legitimate cause in that to divert General Ewell from doing what he may have seen his commander had intended to order him to do. When an enemy attacks with one flank, it is often best, not only for the purpose of diversion, but of wrenching victory, to attack vigorously his other flank. And this was the very object of General Beauregard's second plan of action, with the ultimate purpose of cutting off the enemy's retreat, as General Ewell, who was an intelligent soldier, perfectly well understood from the order already given.

Since General Ewell had received General Beauregard's order to hold himself "in readiness to take the offensive upon Centreville at a moment's notice," General Johnston is not warranted in asserting that "he had no reason to suppose that his commander desired him to move to Centreville . . . where [adds he] there was no enemy."

Now Centreville was distant four and a half miles in an air line from Union Mills, and, of course, it was impossible for General Ewell to know, through the hills and woods that intervened, as it was not his concern to question whether there was any enemy at Centreville.

There is less excuse, however, for General Johnston so misrepresenting at this day in the face of the well-known fact that Blenker's brigade was there over 3,000 strong. General Beauregard so states in his report, and the Federal reports are clear as to that fact.

The truth is, that it would not have been necessary to march as far as Centreville to reach them, because this force was thrown somewhat forward between Centreville and Union Mills in a sort of echelon with Richardson's and Davies' brigades.

It is trifling with the general unmilitary reader for General Johnston to say that there was no enemy at Centreville, but only between it and our right, and that therefore Ewell should not have moved on Centreville because he would have found no enemy there. This village held the Federal trains of supply, and was immediately on their only line of retreat, as well as being their *point d'appui* for advance; its capture was the key to their decisive overthrow, and so treated in the plan of battle upon which our forces were then acting (excepting so far as Ewell's casualty of delay, unknown to us, was suspending it).

The exact location of the enemy's forces could not be known from the nature of the ground; but, whether their left were around Centreville or had advanced down the roads nearer to Jones and Ewell's assigned positions, there could be no difference in the latter's duty. He was to take his position on the right of the line of battle which was forming for the general attack of the enemy's forces, whether more or less near, between Bull Run and Centreville. Both Generals Ewell and Jones, as sensible soldiers, understood this, and the orders sent to Ewell and received by him plainly state it.¹ It was the enemy, of course, and not an abstract geo-

¹ See orders, pp. 113, 114, 156.

graphical point that was to be attacked,—and if, instead of remaining at Centreville and along the Warrenton turnpike, the enemy came down the roads nearer to Bull Run, it was all the better, as his troops, not ours, thus had the fatigue of the march, and our forces would of course attack him wherever met on the way to Centreville.

The execution of orders in the field is not to be made by the yardstick. They are necessarily in some respects to be affected by the circumstances encountered. Therefore, if Davies and Richardson, who were completely outflanked by General Jones' line of march, should not have been "swept from the field" by the advance of that part of our line immediately in front of them (according to the rule of certainty so readily applied by General Johnston in his calculation as to what an enemy will do),¹ it would, of course, have been the duty of Ewell, whose place in the line of attack was on Jones' immediate right, to support the rest of the line against the immediate enemy. Davies and Richardson constituted with Blenker, who had remained near Centreville, a force of about 9,000 men, but easily overcomable by the early fatal flank exposure of the two former.

General Johnston's final remark that "there could have been no greater mistake on General Ewell's part than making the movement to Centreville," is simply a re-condemnation of General Beauregard's second plan of battle, under which all the forces (excepting, through accident, General Ewell) were

¹ See p. 61 ante.

acting—another criticism by which General Johnston again unconsciously gives evidence that he could not have been exercising the command on that field, to which he now sets up a claim.

And now as to General Ewell, the question is simply this :

General Jones, who received at seven o'clock his order to advance to the attack, which stated that Ewell had been already ordered to take the offensive, says in his report that at 7:10 he communicated for that purpose with General Ewell.

He further states that about 9:30 he received an inquiry from General Ewell as to what his orders were, and he thereupon sent him a despatch containing a copy of that order.

The distance between them at seven o'clock, that is, when both were behind their respective fords on Bull Run, was three and a quarter miles ; the distance from Jones' advanced position when he had crossed the Run was not much more easily traversed by a courier in twenty minutes.

General Ewell in his report says nothing about General Jones' message reported by the latter to have been sent immediately after seven o'clock, but speaks only of the later one, sent at half-past nine. It must have been from this statement in the official report of General Jones that the writer had the impression that General Ewell, though not blamable, should have acted otherwise. If he did not receive that early communication from General Jones, of course the commentary does not apply. The writer

has since searched up the unpublished correspondence on this subject, which he gives below.

As in all such cases a person is entitled to the benefit of any doubt, he must say that, if that correspondence had been at hand before him, he would not have made the commentary on General Ewell's failure to exercise discretion or seek instruction as to advancing,—that is, on the proper assumption that he had not received General Jones' seven o'clock message.

In order to do the fullest justice to General Ewell, all the documents bearing upon the subject are given as follows :

I. MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., July 21, 1861.
GENERAL :

You will hold yourself in readiness to take the offensive on Centreville at a moment's notice, to make a diversion against the enemy's intended attack on Mitchell's Ford, and probably Stone Bridge. You will protect well your right flank against any attack from the eastward.¹ General Holmes' brigade will support your movement. If the enemy be prepared to attack in front of your left, leave it (said brigade) in proper position, with orders to take the offensive when it hears your engagement on the other side of the Run.

I intend to take the offensive throughout my front as soon as possible.

Resp'ly your Obd't Sev't,
(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Brig.-Gen. Comdg.

¹ This had reference to any troops that might be coming from the quarter of Washington City.—G. T. B.

2. The subsequent order to move to the attack. This order General Ewell states he never received. The courier that carried it was directed to take it first to Ewell's support, General Holmes, as he was posted on the way to Ewell, and nearer than he to Camp Pickens at Manassas, General Beauregard's head-quarters at that time. He never delivered it either to Holmes or Ewell. Its substance is given in the order sent to General Jones, and contained in the latter's note on the field to Ewell, as follows :

Brig.-Genl. EWELL,

Union Mills Ford :

I received the following order at 7.10 o'clock.

July 21, 1861.

GENERAL :

General Ewell has been ordered to take the offensive upon Centreville. You will follow the movement at once by attacking the enemy in your front.

Resp'y,
(Sgd.) G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

To Brig.-Genl. D. R. JONES,

Comdg. 3d Brig. :

The head of my column now rests upon the road from U. Mills to Centreville—the enemy are moving about in front of Mitchell's and Blackburn's Fords.

Resptly,
(Sgd.) D. R. JONES,
Brig.-Genl. Comdg. 3d Brig.

3. General D. R. Jones' report, which says that at 7:10, after he received his orders to advance to the attack, he communicated with General Ewell in respect thereto. (See above, p. 114.)

4. In Ewell's report, nothing is said of the hour at which he received the notice which Jones reports he sent him "immediately" after his reception of orders at 7:10.

5. The following correspondence between General Ewell and General Beauregard :

UNION MILLS, July 25, 1861.

General BEAUREGARD :

SIR:—In a conversation with Major James, La. 6th, he has left the impression on my mind that you think some of your orders on the 21st were either not carried out or not received by me. My first order on that day was to hold myself ready to attack. This at sunrise. About ten, General Jones sent a copy of an order received by him, in which it was stated I had been ordered to cross and attack, and on receipt of this I moved on until I received the following :

"10:30 A.M. On account of the difficulties of the ground in our front it is thought advisable to fall back to our former positions.¹

"G. T. B.

"General EWELL."

If any other order was sent to me I should like to have a copy of it, as well as the name of the courier who brought it.

¹ See Letter to Ewell, p. 117, as to the true cause. On grounds of prudence the full reason was not then given in this communication.

Every movement I made was at once reported to you at the time—and this across Bull Run as well as the advance in the afternoon, I thought was explained in my report sent in to-day.

If an order was sent earlier than the copy through General Jones, the courier should be held responsible, as neither General Holmes nor myself received it. I send the original of the order to fall back in the morning.

The second advance in the afternoon and recall to Stone Bridge were in consequence of verbal orders.

My chief object in writing to you is to ask you to leave nothing doubtful in your report both as regards my crossing in the morning and recall, and not to let it be inferred by any possibility that I blundered on that day I moved forward as soon as notified by General Jones that he was ordered and I had been. If there was an order sent to me to advance, before the one I received through General Jones, it is more than likely it would have been given to the same express.

Respectfully,

R. S. EWELL,

Brig.-Genl.

MANASSAS, VA., July 26, 1861.

GENERAL:

Your letter of the 25th inst. is received. I do not attach the least blame to you for the failure of the movement on Centreville, but to the guide who did not deliver the order to move forward, sent at about 8 h. A.M.¹ to

¹ This hour is an error, proceeding from inadvertence; General Beauregard's report states that these orders were issued at 5:30. General Jones, on Ewell's left, received his at seven. The hour of sending could not have been later than six. This erroneous date of the hour is used by a correspondent in the *Century* (See *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, Vol. I., p. 259), together with some other misapprehensions of his own, to the framing of several problems, in the solution of which, therefore, no one has any interest.

General Holmes and then to you, corresponding in every respect to the one sent to Generals Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham—only their movements were subordinate to yours.

Unfortunately no copy, in the hurry of the moment, was kept of said order, and so many guides—about a dozen or more—were sent off in different directions that it is next to impossible to find out who was the bearer of the order referred to.

Our guides and couriers were the worst set I ever employed; whether from ignorance or over-anxiety to do well and quickly, I cannot say, but many regiments lost their way repeatedly in their route towards the field of battle, and, of course, I can attach no more blame to their commanding officers than I could to you for not executing an order which I am convinced you did not get.

I am fully aware that you did all that could have been expected of you or your command.

I merely expressed my regret that my original plan could not be carried into effect, as it then would have been a most complete victory with only half the trouble and fighting.

The true cause of countermanding your forward movement after you had crossed was that it was then too late, as the enemy was about to annihilate our left flank and had to be met and checked there, for otherwise he would have taken us in flank and in rear and all would have been lost.¹

Yours truly,

(Sgd.) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

General R. S. EWELL,
Union Mills, Va.

P. S.—Please read the above to Major James.

¹ See reference at p. 86.

Aug. 9th, 1861.

General G. T. BEAUREGARD :

Dear Sir :—Whilst your victory has given you immortality, you will make allowance for the pain I feel at misstatements calculated to injure me, some of which, in Southern papers, have just been brought to my notice.

If you will add to your letter, which I enclose, a post-script stating that the orders for me to advance on the morning of the 21st were sent to General Holmes and not to me for our action, also that in the afternoon I was recalled to Stone Bridge by your order when across Bull Run, it will enable me to place a stopper on the errors that have sprung up in this matter.

You may remember stating the substance of this to me when I saw you a few evenings since.

I don't propose your letter for publication except by your permission. Should any such necessity arise I will consult you.

Evil-disposed persons say that my going to Stone Bridge was without authority.

Please return these by the bearer ; and I feel confident that your sympathy for my troubles will excuse the annoyance I give you.

Respectfully,

R. S. EWELL.

P. S.—Holmes' position was a new one, mine was occupied several days. Hence a failure to find him was easy.

R. S. EWELL.

XIV.

In his "Narrative" (p. 56) General Johnston, after enumerating the strength of General Beauregard's army and adding that a large proportion was not engaged, says : " This was a great fault on my [his] part. When Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and Early should have been sent to the left also and placed in the interval."

As that criticism is addressed to the after-event of the Federal flank and rear attack around our left which became feasible, only through Ewell's accidental failure to receive orders to attack, General Johnston might better have said also that Ewell's forces, part of Jones' and Longstreet's and of Bonham's—all those that afterwards were sent to the left into the battle, or that proved by the accident of the day to be unnecessary in the rightward lines—should have been sent, not only to that "vicinity" but to the very plateau of the Robinson and Henry houses, and in ambush in the woods upon the left of it ; in fine, to the best positions upon the field where the battle was actually fought. A proposition from aftersight might as well be complete.

It is to be noted that this severe self-condemnation is coupled with the assumption of a victory on his part—a self-condemnation the like of which is not to be found in any remaining part of a work (his “Narrative”) which consists mainly of apologies for events of a different character. The latent object of the criticism of this “great fault on my part” transpires, as an attempt to condemn General Beauregard’s dispositions and to attract to himself the idea of the command. As a criticism it is virtually contradicted by his other statement (p. 45) that the sending of Bee, Hampton, and Jackson to the left at the time “seemed sufficient.” But as the employment of the bulk of the forces on the “new field” was the result of a sheer accident, the not sending them to that quarter in the beginning may have been a blind misfortune, but could not have been a “great fault.” If it was anybody’s fault, it was General Beauregard’s, as he was exercising the command; but as his plan of attack, which he had ordered to be executed, required those forces to be on the right to support our offensive movement, and as he could not operate two opposite plans at the same time, it would have been a “great fault” for General Beauregard not to have left them where he had placed them in the lines of attack,—and where, it may be added, they would have done such rapid and decisive work, but for the miscarriage of his orders to Ewell, that there would have been no service even for Bee, Jackson,

and Hampton to perform on the "new field," to the "vicinity" of which General Johnston says all the forces in question should have been sent.

It may now be said that it was certainly a great misfortune and a fault, the writer admits, that the troops referred to were not engaged—but not through the means indicated by General Johnston.

At the time General Beauregard abandoned the attack from our right and ordered up reinforcements, including Holmes, from that and other quarters to the left at eleven A.M., he should also have re-urged Ewell, Holmes, Jones, and Longstreet to the *attack* of the enemy between Bull Run and Centreville, instead of directing them to maintain a strong demonstration in front of the Run in that quarter. Ewell was later ordered to march to the battle-field on the left by General Johnston, but neither he nor Holmes reached it, the Federal rout having begun while they were on the way; whereas, if by a much shorter march they had engaged the enemy's other isolated force in front of Bull Run towards our right, their movement would have decisively outflanked it and placed them in possession of the Warrenton turnpike and across the line of retreat of all the enemy's routed forces. This operation would also have precipitated the rout of the enemy's flanking column.

So much for criticisms of pure aftersight which, though they may sometimes confirm, from the accomplished fact, a sound military judgment made

with respect to the only legitimate premises—the knowledge and appearances present to the commander at the time,—yield as a rule but vain commentaries as to blame or praise, and often mislead as to the highest office of military criticism—that is, instruction. Blunders, single or serial, have often immediately operated success, and wise plans failure; but, however sentimental speculation may dress them from aftersight of events, judicial criticism will still retain its measure of their character and class their actual results where they belong—with the haps of fortune. “We must not decide,” says Frederick, “upon the goodness of a plan by the issue of the enterprise.”

XV.

The above statement by General Johnston that a large portion of the Army of the Potomac was not engaged, provides ready contradiction for what follows (p. 60 of his "Narrative"), in excusing the failure to advance after the victory :

"We were almost as much disorganized as the Federals"—a statement thus enlarged in his *Century* article (p. 106) : "Our army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat."

The following despatches of the Federal commander, General McDowell to his government, show the condition of that army :

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, July 22, 1861.

The men having thrown away their haversacks in the battle and left them behind, they are without food, and have eaten nothing since breakfast. We are without artillery ammunition. *The larger part of the men are a confused mob entirely demoralized.*¹

It was the opinion of all the commanders that no stand could be made this side of the Potomac.

¹ Present italics.

We will, however, make the attempt at Fairfax Court-House. From a prisoner we learn that 20,000 from Johnston joined last night, and they march on us to-night.

(Signed) IRVIN McDOWELL.

Colonel TOWNSEND.

Again :

FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, July 22, 1861.

Many of the volunteers did not wait for authority to proceed to the Potomac, but left on their own decision. *They are now pouring through this place in a state of utter disorganization.* They could not be prepared for action by to-morrow morning *even were they willing.*¹ I learn from prisoners that we are to be pressed here to-night and to-morrow morning, and the enemy's force is very large and they are elated. I think we heard cannon on our rear-guard. I think now, as all my commanders thought at Centreville, there is no alternative but to fall back to the Potomac, and I shall proceed to do so with as much regularity as possible.

(Signed) IRVIN McDOWELL.

Colonel TOWNSEND.

And General McClellan, who superseded General McDowell, thus reports the condition of the Federal army upon his assumption of the command :

"I found no army to command, a mere collection of regiments, cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat."²

However much the policy of the moment, as well as tenderness for the feeling of the troops,

¹ Present italics.

² McClellan's Report, p. 44.



may at the time enjoin silence as to certain incidents, the writer of history is at least free to say the truth about them ; and, were the facts such as stated by General Johnston, General Beauregard would freely admit them. But, in the name of his own gallant Army of the Potomac, and in the name also of those earnest men of the Army of the Shenandoah who on that day fought under his own immediate eye and command, he repudiates as utterly unwarranted this statement advanced by General Johnston as an excuse for our failure to reap the fruits of success, namely, that our forces were either "almost as much disorganized" or "more disorganized" by victory than was the army of the United States by defeat. Such a sentence could only be true at the cost of the mental and moral sense of our soldiers.

All of Ewell's, Holmes', D. R. Jones', Longstreet's brigades, and two regiments of Bonham's were fresh, none of them, excepting Jones', having been engaged, and that only in a brief skirmish. Early's brigade also had hardly been under fire, and its organization was complete, besides that of some new regiments that had come up during the day, notably Barksdale's. These constituted in all a force of at least 15,000 fresh troops, that is, more than half of the forces—a most unusual proportion of fresh troops after a battle. The remaining commands, with the ambition infused by triumph, would have been instantly reorganized

through eagerness to join their advance. There is nothing that dispirits and disorganizes an army as defeat, and, on the other hand, nothing that gives such elasticity and force as victory. It is, therefore, very important at the outset of a campaign or war to have the first success, however small. Such was the success of Sumter, and the Bull Run victory of the 18th of July; but the victory of Manassas was a thing of inestimable value as respected the troops, and remained conspicuous in its influence throughout the summer and fall operations. Wherever the fault lay for not gathering its true advantages, it is utterly groundless to say it lay with the troops. As far as they were concerned, an army could never advance if not after such a victory, and the excuse has a strange look alongside of General McDowell's despatch of next day expressing his dread of being pressed by the "elated" victorious forces.

In view of such a judgment pronounced by General Johnston, it may well be asked, of what use is a victory or of what use was an army to us except as an assemblage of men, who must never advance, but wait for an enemy, and then retreat before him, or perhaps fight a barren defensive action, leaving the enemy, if defeated, to recover at leisure and return. It seems, with the corroboration of other subsequent well-known events, to justify the opinion expressed to me by my Chief-of-Staff, General Jordan (when his prediction of the coming

order to fall back from Fairfax Court-House¹ was realized), that if General Johnston had come to Manassas some days earlier so as to have familiarized himself sufficiently to take direction, there would have been no battle of Manassas, but a falling back behind the Rappahannock.

In further excuse of a failure to advance after the victory, General Johnston condemns as intrinsically unsound any operation for the crossing of the Potomac, overrunning Maryland and capturing Washington, and cites General Lee's two unfortunate attempts made one and two years later. Of these it is only pertinent here to say that they were made under very different conditions. But General Johnston, in giving this as his judgment at the time of the victory of Manassas, as well as when writing his "Narrative" after the war, contradicts his own deliberate approval of the plan for precisely such an enterprise submitted to President Davis at Fairfax Court-House at the beginning of the following October, 1861.

He happens to accentuate this contradiction when he comes to give the history of the proposal of that operation, which furnished perhaps the leading opportunity for the decisive success of our cause; that is to say, although making no express assertion, he so states the matter that the peruser of his "Narrative" (p. 75) could but read that it emanated from himself; whereas the enterprise was con-

¹ P. 11.

ceived by General Beauregard and matured in its details, including a reconnaissance for the crossing of the Potomac, which he had had made from his advanced position, before the plan was broached to General Johnston. It received the ready approval of Major-General Gustavus W. Smith, but General Johnston only came into the plan after hesitation, according to his usual habit relative to any offensive operation.

There are other points which might be touched ; but it seems unnecessary to give any further evidences of the character of General Johnston's account, the separate parts of which are each so strained to the immediate purpose as to present essential inconsistencies that are better proofs of its theoretical nature than even its grave misrepresentations of the documentary evidence.



XVI.

GENERAL JORDAN'S SUMMARY CRITICISM OF GENERAL JOHNSTON'S "NARRATIVE."

At the time of the publication of General Johnston's "Narrative," my former Chief-of-Staff, General Jordan, gave to the daily press a statement which will summarize the subject with clearness and force to the reader of these pages, and deserves this permanent place for historical reference.

To the Editor of the New York Evening Mail:

In your notice of General Joseph E. Johnston's "Narrative of Military Operations," it is stated that "the best part of the book is that which refers to the first Bull Run campaign. In this General Johnston is almost invariably correct in his actions and conclusions. . . ."

"Johnston knew the value of concentration for a fight. He played with Patterson, deceived him, reinforced Beauregard, and won a victory which equal common-sense and generalship would have given to us."

This statement of course grows out of the supposition that the strategy which led to, and the tactics of, the successful Confederate forces, in the memorable battle of the 21st of July, 1861, emanated from General Johnston.

Admitting that something of the language of the work in question warrants the conclusion cited, the present writer, who was in a position at the time to know the facts, feels called upon, in the interest of history, to show that the Confederate commander was Beauregard, and none other.

Johnston was indeed the superior officer present ; nevertheless, he neither assumed the chief command upon arrival, immediately preceding the action, nor in any substantial manner took direction of the battle after it was engaged, and for reasons by no means hard to explain.

(1st) He did not come upon the theatre of operation until about noon the day before the battle, and brought with him barely 6,000 men. Already, on the 18th, Beauregard's forces had been in collision with and repelled McDowell's army in an effort to pass Bull Run at Blackburn's Ford. A general engagement was evidently impending, and was already materially prepared for by Beauregard.

(2d) The responsibility for that battle was a very grave one. It was the first of the war, and defeat would not only bring supreme disaster to the cause at stake, but fatal discredit to the general who had affronted battle under so many unfavorable circumstances.

(3d) The immediate position and surrounding country were wholly unknown to Johnston, but as familiar to Beauregard as a nursery tale.

(4th) Further, the great bulk of the troops were of Beauregard's organization, with supreme faith in him. They knew nothing of Johnston, nor he aught of them, except that they were not regular troops.

(5th) The strategic movement which had brought Johnston with a portion of his forces upon the scene was emphatically of Beauregard's conception. Urgently sug-

gested by him, it was only acceded to and carried out by Johnston, as can be shown, upon Beauregard's strenuous telegraphic appeals—made as late as July 17th—for the junction of the two armies.

Under such circumstances it was very natural for Johnston to leave with Beauregard the responsibility of so tremendous an issue as the one now inevitable; and so, waiving the command, he left to Beauregard the execution of that general's own plan of battle, with the details of which he was made acquainted during the afternoon and night of the 20th of July. That Johnston should have done this was to his credit, and it is to be regretted that any thing in the language of his "Narrative" should give countenance to the idea that he now sets up the claim to any control over a successful battle, of the issue of which he is at the pains to say: "If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we (the Confederates) should have been beaten" (p. 57). For, such being his present view of what should have come to pass, the thought will occur to even the casual reader that he must have apprehended disaster at the opening of the battle; and this will be sure to furnish to some minds a conclusive explanation of his failure to assume the baton of command until the battle was won.

As proof that he did not assume command any sooner, it must be held conclusive that the chief or detailed official report of the battle was addressed to the Confederate Adjutant-General, not by Johnston, but by Beauregard.

In the report, the precise circumstances of the command and responsibility for the battle are expressed in terms which, unless Beauregard had been in actual direction of the united forces upon the field, must have been treated by Johnston as an impudent assumption, not to pass without contradiction. That was the time to raise

the question. It was not done, and the mere fact of abstract superiority of grade will not support the claim now first made visible.

In conclusion it should be stated that the chief honors of the victory were unequivocally accorded at the period to Beauregard by the press and people, as also by the army engaged, while the views of the Confederate authorities are made patent by the following official letters, the one from the Secretary of War, and the other from General Lee.¹

The sole purpose of the present writer has been to correct the proposition that it was Johnston who, conceiving the plan of operations which resulted in his junction with Beauregard, had won the battle of the 21st of July, 1861. Therefore no general criticism of General Johnston's account of the battle has been attempted, notwithstanding it abounds in material that will not be suffered to pass unnoticed in proper season.

T. J.

NEW YORK, April 15, 1874.

¹ These letters are given above, p. 6.

XVII.

No man, and least of all General Johnston, may say that General Beauregard has been jealous of his merit or title. But it has transpired from General Johnston's "Narrative" that, within two days after the battle of Manassas, and while on the field, the President "offered" him (that is, desired that he should go to) the command in Western Virginia, subsequently conferred on General Lee. This command, as he says, he declined, because, considering the theatre of operations in the quarter of Manassas of the more important character, he was "unwilling to be removed" from it—that is, ignoring all the circumstances under which he had been brought into that field, as well as the fact that the troops he had brought there were not a third of the forces, he found it convenient, though invited to another command, to avail himself of his seniority to supplant General Beauregard.

On the other hand, within a few days after the battle of Manassas, General Beauregard's army

(the Army of the Potomac) was, at his own suggestion, termed the First Corps, and General Johnston's (the Army of the Shenandoah) was termed the Second Corps, of the Army of the Potomac. Though now of equal grade with General Johnston, he thus voluntarily assumed the titular command of a major-general. This, however, was not approved by the President, who would not recognize this nominal division of the forces now assembled in that quarter. General Beauregard's own army remained under his command and administration as a distinct army, while General Johnston's remained under his, though immediately commanded by Major-General Gustavus W. Smith.

But in November, 1861, a military department was established, comprising the districts of the Potomac, the Shenandoah, and the Acquia. The forces in the District of the Potomac, General Johnston's and General Beauregard's, were then consolidated into one army—the Army of the Potomac—and the latter was appointed the commander of the district and of that army as consolidated, so far as the action of the government went; but the command of the whole army was not duly transferred to him by General Johnston, as was desired by the government. The previous separate army administration, therefore, was continued, and in official correspondence and intercourse with the government led to disagreeable complications, the

annoyance of which General Beauregard suffered rather than suggest to General Johnston the only right solution in which the initiative belonged to himself.¹

They radically disagreed in tendency and judgment as to the military policy to be pursued, General Beauregard urging and assuming offensive dispositions, and General Johnston believing in the opposite, chiefly through dread of a Federal move-

¹ SUMMERS HOUSE, Dec. 27, 1861.

DEAR GENERAL :

It is so bitter cold in the wind to-night that I shall not go over . . . I submit to your consideration the rough note of a letter to General Johnston on a subject really of importance. The War Department persistently ignores the existence of *corps commands* and addresses you as Commander of the "Potomac District."

General Johnston does not give you the district command, and you cannot assume it ; but he never, in orders, gave you the Corps command. You took the designation yourself. In view of the action and repeatedly expressed wishes of the War Department, I submit that you should drop the designation of *Headquarters 1st Corps*, and inform General Johnston of the fact. It is best for all. I sincerely believe that this should be done ; otherwise some difficulty will grow out of it, though, as yet, the speck is not as large as one's hand.

Yours truly,

THOMAS JORDAN.

General BEAUREGARD.

SUMMER'S HOUSE, Jan. 17, 1862.

DEAR GENERAL :

Under cover to you came this morning packages addressed to all the Colonels of the Army of the Potomac of both Corps and the reserves, and which packages were severally addressed care of "General Beauregard." Now these packages I *know* to contain the orders about re-enlistments and recruitment. I found in the package a number of loose copies of both orders—copies of which I enclose for your files.

This is another marked instance of the *determination* at Richmond, to hold you as the Commander of the A. P. [Army of the Potomac]. . . .

Yours truly,

THOMAS JORDAN.

General BEAUREGARD.

ment on our rear by way of the Potomac and Evansport. But, even if the moral effect of the defeat of the Federals had not made their commander too timid to attempt at that time any such operation, the reliable and regular information which General Beauregard had from Washington through a perfect spy system, organized by his Chief-of-Staff, Colonel Jordan, and the close observation he maintained of the shores of the Potomac would have advised us opportunely of such a movement, which could have been made immediately fatal to the Federals, as we had an excellent line of communication with the valley of Virginia, enabling us to operate with deadly effect in that event upon the enemy's own rear.

Notwithstanding such inaction and the keen dissatisfaction felt by General Beauregard at seeing the fall pass away with every offensive disposition assumed by him gradually curtailed to a mere defensive attitude, together with the loss of the due benefits of our victory—which would not have happened without an earnest attempt to achieve something decisive had General Beauregard been unhampered in command—he maintained, nevertheless, a perfect and sincere good understanding with General Johnston. He claims no credit for this in itself, nor would he now mention it but that this later course on General Johnston's part fitly calls attention to it.

The writer has acutely regretted that a duty to

himself, as well as to the truth of history, has forced him to treat this subject; but it is for him to sustain that unaltering truth as he knows it to be, now that it is so openly impugned.

General Johnston might have retained those high encomiums, so worthy of the purest ambition of the soldier, which history has unfailingly given to the magnanimous men who have been mentioned at the beginning of these pages; but he has turned away from such praise to become the claimant of an honor raised upon the very abstraction which history reveres those men for disregarding.

Going back to the time overhanging the issue, it is evident that General Johnston was in such an attitude that, if disaster instead of victory had befallen our arms, General Beauregard must have been held responsible for it. Nor would the writer be justified in presuming that General Johnston, in that case, would have prosecuted a claim to the defeat. It is not fair that, after the event, he should be free to shift his seat according to the result.

October 31, 1886.

APPENDIX A.

HEADQUARTERS, 1st CORPS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
CENTREVILLE, VA., Decbr. 5, 1861.

Major-Genl. JAS. LONGSTREET,
Comdg. 2d Div., near Centreville.

General :

As it may become suddenly important to prevent the Enemy's Balloon observations from discovering whether or not we have guns in our Batteries, or more properly, to let them believe that *we have* ; you will have at once the position of each gun protected from *aërial* view, by a rough shed of leaves & brushwood, elevated about six feet from the ground or at the height of the crest, putting in each embrasure a piece of wood of the proper size (blackened) to represent a gun.

Endeavor to have this done as soon as practicable.

Respectfully,

Your obdt. servt.,
(Sgd.) G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Genl. Comdg.

TAYLOR'S Decbr. 6, 1861.

My dear General :

But two of the Redoubts have been set apart for the batteries of my division. I have ordered sheds on the

embrasures of these & blackened logs put in them : no others. If you desire me to have others fixed please advise me.

Very sincerely yours,
(Sgd.) J. LONGSTREET,
Maj.-Genl.

Genl. G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Ans : Arrange all to be garrisoned by the 2d Division.
G. T. B.

APPENDIX B.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MANASSAS JUNCTION, July 11th, 1861.

His Excellency, JEFFERSON DAVIS,
President of Confederate States of America,
Richmond, Va.

Sir :

I have the honor to transmit herewith the Field Return of the Army under my command, from which you will perceive the effective force at my disposition is as follows : Light Artillery, 533 with 27 pieces ; Cavalry, 1,425 ; Foot Artillery, 293 ; and Infantry, 16,150 ; in all, 18,401 men of all arms. From this must be deducted the command of Col. Hunton at Leesburg of some 445 men, who will remain in position there until the Enemy shall have advanced to attack my outposts, when the Colonel will fall back and unite his force with that of Col. Cocke, Commanding the 5th Brigade at the Stone Bridge across Bull Run. Col. Sloan's Regiment, 4th South Carolina Vols., has already fallen back from Leesburg to Frying-pan Church, preparatory to a junction with Col. Cocke at Centreville.

I have every reason to believe that the Enemy will begin his advance from his present position, at or about Fall's Church, to-morrow or on the following day, with a force not short of 35,000 men, supported by a reserve of

not less than 15,000 Infantry. To these I can oppose but about 16,500, reserving about 1,500 merely for camp guards, pickets, and the garrison of the entrenched Camp here.

In consequence of this great disparity in numbers, I have issued the Special Orders, No. 100, enclosed herewith, concentrating my troops in the exigency on the naturally strong positions enumerated therein, afforded by Bull Run, in the hope of conducting the movement so as to induce the enemy to offer me battle in front of Mitchell's Ford, where his numerical superiority would be materially counterbalanced by the difficulties of the ground, and my previous preparations there for the event. But I am, however, inclined to believe he may attempt to turn my left flank by a movement in the direction of Vienna, Frying-pan Church, and possibly Gum Spring, and thus cut off Johnston's line of retreat on, and communications with, this place, via the Manassas Gap R. Road, while threatening my own communications with Richmond and Depots of supply by the Alexandria & Orange R. Road, and opening his communications with the Potomac through Leesburg and Edward's Ferry.

Of course, if I had a sufficient force, one less unequal to that of the enemy, I would not permit him, with impunity, to attempt so dangerous a movement on his part; but in view of the odds against me, and of the vital importance at this junction of avoiding the hazard of a defeat, which would open to the enemy the way to Richmond, I shall act with extreme caution. If forced, however, to retire before an overwhelming force, by another route than the Railroad, my line of retreat can be taken at any time, through Brentsville to a junction with Brigadier-General Holmes, at or near Fredericksburg, whence we could operate on the line of communication of the enemy

on their advance, so as at least to retard him by the way. In that event, if deemed expedient, I could leave a suitable garrison in the intrenchments here, to occupy him and retard his advance the longer, but with orders to spike our guns and follow in my rear until effecting a reunion with me.

In presenting the foregoing to the consideration of your Excellency, I wish it distinctly understood, however, that if the enemy should offer battle on the line of Bull Run, I shall accept it for my command, against whatsoever odds he may array in my front.

Respectfully Sir,

Yours obdt. servt.

(Signed)

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

Gen'l commdg.

APPENDIX C.

HD. QRS., ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH,
WINCHESTER, June 21st, 1861.

Brig.-Genl. BEAUREGARD,

Comm'dng. Army of the Potomac :

My dear General :

My chief directs me to say that the move from Harper's Ferry was predicated on the absolute necessity of securing all our communications & providing against the chance of the enemy turning your flank, either by Manassas Gap or the passes to the north of it. At Harper's Ferry, while as an operating Army in an untenable & most absurd position, our own effect was entirely neutralized, we could neither defend ourselves, Virginia, nor threaten the enemy. Here we are able, I hope, to do something.

Upon our leaving Harper's Ferry & advancing towards Martinsburg & Winchester, the enemy who had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport with 8000 to 10,000 troops removed in haste and commenced a retrograde movement on the Hagerstown & Boonsboro' road, *probably* with a view to moving near Leesburg & operating against you on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge. It is possible, that the enemy regarded Harper's Ferry as of greater importance than it really was & imagined that by our evacuation of the place we design to

give our whole attention to the advance of the western column of invasion & therefore, regarding his object as accomplished, he is left free by an evacuation to concentrate his whole force on you. If this be so, two points 17 miles to the E. of us becomes important, to wit, Snicker's Gap & Ashby's Gap, through both of which good turn-pike roads cross the mountains to Alexandria. The General seeing this has already ordered these passes to be occupied by Cavalry out-posts, as well as directed scouts with Loudon to obtain as rapidly as possible the earliest information of the enemy under Patterson. Stone is already comm'dg to Newspapers at Leesburg. It then appears important that in view of the recent movement in this valley, the two Confederate Armies should be put in close communication by relays of expresses. Can you not advance your pickets to Paris or communicate through Ashby's Gap with those from this Army. In the event of a move upon you, having now cleared the enemy from this part of the Valley, the General might be able to throw from 5000 to 6000 men on his flank.¹ He is now considering these ideas & endeavouring to ascertain as far as possible the exact condition of the enemy. Please answer.

I am Genl., Yr. true friend,
(Signed) W. H. C. WHITING,
Mj.

¹ See *ante*, pp. 25 *et seq.*

APPENDIX D.

WINCHESTER, June 21st, 1861.

Genl. BEAUREGARD, C. S. A. :

My dear General:

Since Major Whiting wrote this morning I have received a report from the picket near Williamsport, to the effect that at 7 A.M. to-day the enemy was moving along the road to Hagerstown with infantry & cavalry.

I confess myself puzzled by his recent movements near me; why he did n't fight is beyond my comprehension. He ought not to wish for greater odds. Whether now he intends to reinforce Mansfield, cross the Potomac into Loudon, or resume his position of observation near Hagerstown, I can't guess.

In the absence of a common superior, I am anxious to correspond with you—To be informed of your needs—that I may help you when the state of things in my front will permit me to do so.

I have to-day directed Col. Stuart to send a Company of Cavalry to Snicker's Gap (not Ashby's) to scout in Loudon. We may, if we find it worth while, communicate with each other quickly by our Cavalry.

The "Baltimore Sun" of yesterday reports the return to Washington from this vicinity, of 800 regular infantry, under Col. Miles, & a Rhode Island regiment.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) J. E. Johnston,

Brig.-Genl. C. S. A.

APPENDIX E.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., June 22d, 1861.

Genl. JOS. E. JOHNSTON,
Com'g Army of Shenandoah,
Winchester, Va.;

My Dear General:

I have received your and Major Whiting's letters of yesterday.

I had sent an Engineer, Lt. W. H. Stevens, to examine the roads and passes you refer to, as well as some others in Loudoun County.¹ So soon as I receive his report, a copy of it will be sent to you. I consider the chain of Bull Run Mountain, Little River, and Goose Creek a strong secondary line of defense for my left flank, but should they penetrate into Virginia this side of it, by moving rapidly a strong force of your command to Aldie or Leesburg to take them in flank or rear, they would have to fall back on the Potomac, or run the risk of being cut off from their base of operations, particularly if I could attack them from here at the same time. I have a daily Courier from here to Leesburg via Centreville and Guilford. Col. Hunton's will communicate with yours at Snickerville. We could also communicate by Telegraph via Strasburg. With my kindest regards to Major Whiting.

(In haste.)

I remain, Very Truly Yours,
(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD,

¹ See *ante*, p. 25.

APPENDIX F.

HD. QRS., ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., June 24th.

Genl. J. E. JOHNSTON,
Winchester, Va.

My dear General:

Your two letters of the 23d inst. have just been delivered to me. I regret very much the change you have been compelled to make in your arrangements, but I can well appreciate them, altho' I do not believe in the hostile advance of Genl. Patterson, for I am informed, on what I consider good authority, that they have quite a stampede in Washington, thinking that we are going to unite our forces for its attack, or that you are going to cross the Potomac at or about Edward's Ferry to attack it in rear, whilst I attack it in front, hence probably the proposed movement of P. to keep you at bay.

.

Not being able to obtain a full sufficiency of cartridges for my increased forces, I am going to establish a manufactory of them here.

Whenever you can spare a few guns for Leesburg, pray send them.

Yours very truly,
(S'g'd) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX G.

HEADQUARTERS, MANASSAS, DEPT. OF VA.,
CAMP PICKENS, June 12th, 1861.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT DAVIS :

Sir :

The bearer, Lieutenant Colonel Sam Jones of the Provisional Army of Virginia, a member of my general staff, has been instructed by me to lay before your Excellency a diagram, with my views relative to the operations of the present campaign in this State, which should be acted upon at once.

The enemy seem to be taking the offensive towards Harper's Ferry, and a few days hence may find General J. E. Johnston in such a critical condition as to render it impossible to relieve him. If he were ordered to abandon forthwith his present position and concentrate suddenly his forces with mine, guarding with small detachments all the passes through which the enemy might follow him, we could, by a bold and rapid movement forward, retake Arlington Heights and Alexandria, if not too strongly fortified and garrisoned, which would have the effect of recalling all the enemy's forces from Northern Virginia for the protection of Washington. But should General Johnston be unable to unite his forces with mine, then he ought to be instructed to retreat at the proper time towards

Richmond, through the Valley of Virginia, checking the enemy wherever and whenever he can. When compelled to abandon my present position I will fall back also on Richmond; the forces along the lower Potomac, on the Peninsula and at Norfolk may have to do likewise. Then, acting on interior lines from Richmond as a centre (our forces being increased by the reserves at that point), we could crush in rapid succession and in detail, the several columns of the enemy, which I have supposed would move on three or four different lines. With thirty-five thousand men properly handled, I have not the least doubt that we could annihilate fifty thousand of the enemy. I beg and entreat that a concerted plan of operations be adopted at once by the Government for its different columns. Otherwise we will be assailed in detail by superior forces and will be cut off or destroyed entirely. Lieutenant Colonel Jones will present my views more in detail to your Excellency.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Brig.-Genl. Comdg.

APPENDIX H.

MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., July 13, 1861.

General J. E. JOHNSTON:

My dear General:

I write in haste. What a pity we cannot carry into effect the following plan of operations: That you should leave four or five thousand men to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and unite the mass of your troops with mine. We will probably have, in a few days, about forty thousand men to operate with. This force would enable us to destroy the forces of Generals Scott and McDowell in my front. Then we would go back with as many men as necessary to attack and disperse General Patterson's army, before he could know positively what had become of you. We could then proceed to General McClellan's theatre of war, and treat him likewise, after which we could pass over into Maryland to operate in rear of Washington. I think this whole campaign could be completed brilliantly in from fifteen to twenty-five days. Oh, that we had but one good head to conduct all our operations! We are laboring, unfortunately, under the disadvantage of having about seven armies in the field, under as many independent commanders, which is contrary to the first principles of the art of war. Wishing you, however, ample success in your operations, I remain,

Yours very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

APPENDIX I.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 4th, 1861.

Capt. W. H. STEVENS,
Corps of Engrs., Fairfax C. H., Va.

Capt.:

Your letter of the 29th ulto. has just been communicated to me. The reconnoissance referred to by you is only a general one, such as you made to Leesburg and the passes to the westward of it. It should embrace the country between Difficult Run & Goose Creek, the Potomac, Frying-pan, & Gum Spring; the object of said reconnoissance being either to favor the movement of our troops in that locality to cross the Potomac, or to oppose the enemy in an attempt on his part to advance in that direction to reach the Manassas Gap Rl. Road on the left flank of this position.

Respectfully Your Obdt. Servt.

(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD.

P. S.—Communicate this letter to Genl. Bonham.

APPENDIX J.

HD. QRS., WINCHESTER, July 9th, 1861.

Genl. BEAUREGARD :

My dear General :

I wrote to you yesterday that the intelligence I had just received indicated that the enemy's intention is to advance upon us here. Col. Stuart, who is at the head of our scouting service, has just written to me, that he suspects, for certain circumstances, that he will move forward to-night. We are just beginning some little field works, for which there are here 8 24-pdrs. carronades, but have done too little to make them available,—the platforms are not laid. Militia about 2000 were called out, but they have to prepare their own ammunition, which they have not done. So the chances are against us. Less so, however, than a retreat would make them.

You are as much interested in this as I, so I send you the information.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) J. E. JOHNSTON.

APPENDIX K.

MANASSAS JUNCTION, VA., July 12th, 1861.

Brig.-Genl. R. S. EWELL,
Com'dg 2d Brigade,
Fairfax Sta., Va.

General :

I hope you have understood that, on arriving at Union Mills, you need not cross the ford to this side, unless compelled to by the enemy, for it would be better, in consequence of our projected operations, to take a favorable position at or about the Railroad Station at said mill for the object in view. The same must be done by Col. Rodes at McLean's Ford, where he will enter in communication with Genl. Jones, as you will with Col. Early, & you will all await any orders for advancing, as already instructed. Your wagons &c will cross the Union Mills Ford & retire to near Col. Kempers present encampment, at Camp Wigfall, where they will be out of the way. Should you, however, find it necessary to have Col. Rodes' Regt. with you to protect your right flank or rear, you can order him to await your instructions at or near the point where he will have to cross the main road from Union Mills to Centreville.

Your movement will be supported by four or six pieces of Walton's Battery, perhaps more.

Respy Yr. Obdt. Servt.

(Signed) G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Brig. Genl. Com'dg.

APPENDIX L.

HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
MANASSAS JUNCTION, July 17th, 1861.

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 41. }

I. The General Commanding the Army of the Potomac announces to his command that, at length, the enemy have advanced to subjugate a Sovereign State, and to impose upon a free people, an odious government.

Notwithstanding their numerical superiority, they can be repelled; and the General Commanding relies confidently on his command to do it, and to drive the invaders back beyond his intrenched line. But, to achieve this, the highest order of coolness, individual intelligence and obedience on the part of each officer and man, are essential. Great reliance will be placed on the bayonet, at the proper juncture, but above all, it is enjoined on officers and men to withhold their fire until directed. The superior intelligence of the individual members of this command, should in this respect, compensate for the want of a veteran, long-trained soldiery.

In firing, each man should take aim and never discharge his piece without a distinct object in full view.

II. The following are announced as the General and Personal Staff of the General Commanding, and any writ-

ten or verbal orders conveyed through them or either of them will be obeyed.

Colonel Thomas Jordan, Provisional Army of the Confederate States, A. A. Adj. Genl.

Captain Clifton H. Smith, Provisional Army of Virginia, A. Adj. Genl.

Capt. S. W. Ferguson, C. S. A. Aid-de-Camp.

Lieut. Colonel Thomas H. Williamson, Virginia Army, Chief Engineer.

Capt. E. P. Alexander, Engineer Corps, C. S. A.

Major William S. Cabell, C. S. A., Chief Quarter Master.

Col. R. B. Lee, C. S. A., Chief Commissary of Subsistence.

Surgeon T. H. Williams, Medical Director.

Colonel Sam Jones, C. S. A., Chief of Artillery and Ordnance.

VOLUNTEER AIDS.

Col. James Chesnut, Jr.,	} South Carolina.
" J. L. Manning,	
" W. Porcher Miles,	
" John S. Preston,	
" A. R. Chisolm,	
" Joseph Heywood,	

By Command of Brig. Gen. BEAUREGARD.

(Signed)

THOMAS JORDAN,

A. A. Adj. Genl.

APPENDIX M.

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 20, 1861.

SPECIAL ORDERS

No. —

The following order is published for the information of division and brigade commanders :

I. Brigadier-General Ewell's brigade, supported by General Holmes' brigade, will march *via* Union Mills Ford and place itself in position of attack upon the enemy. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack upon Centreville or to move in the direction of Sangster's Cross-Roads, according to circumstances.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-chief.

II. Brigadier-General Jones' brigade, supported by Colonel Early's brigade, will march *via* McLean's Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, according to circumstances, with its right flank towards the left of Ewell's command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-chief.

III. Brigadier-General Longstreet's brigade, supported by Brigadier-General Jackson's brigade, will march *via* McLean's Ford to place itself in position of attack upon the enemy on or about the Union Mills and Centreville road. It will be held in readiness either to support the attack on Centreville or to move in the direction of Fairfax Court-House, according to circumstances, with its right flank toward the left of Jones' command, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country.

IV. Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade, supported by Colonel Bartow's brigade, will march *via* Mitchell's Ford to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the third division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-chief.

V. Colonel Cocke's brigade, supported by Colonel Elzey's brigade, will march *via* Stone Bridge and the fords on the right thereof to the attack of Centreville, the right wing to the left of the Fourth Division, more or less distant, according to the nature of the country and of the attack.

The order to advance will be given by the Commander-in-chief.

VI. Brigadier-General Bee's brigade, supported by Colonel Wilcox's brigade, Colonel Stuart's regiment of cavalry, and the whole of Walton's battery, will form the reserve, and will march *via* Mitchell's Ford, to be used according to circumstances.

VII. The light batteries will be distributed as follows:

1. To Brigadier-General Ewell's command, Captain Walker's six pieces.
2. To Brigadier-General Jones', Captains Alburtis' and Stanard's batteries, eight pieces.

3. To Brigadier-General Longstreet's, Colonel Pendleton's and Captain Imboden's batteries, eight pieces.

4. To Brigadier-General Bonham's, Captains Kemper's and Shield's batteries, eight pieces.

5. To Colonel Cocke's, Colonel Hunton's and Captains Latham's and Beckham's batteries, twelve pieces.

VIII. Colonel Radford, commanding cavalry, will detail, to report immediately, as follows :

To Brigadier-General Ewell, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Jones, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Longstreet, two companies of cavalry.

To Brigadier-General Bonham, three companies of cavalry.

To Colonel Cocke, the remaining companies of cavalry, except those in special service.

IX. The Fourth and Fifth Divisions, after the fall of Centreville, will advance to the attack of Fairfax Court-House, *via* the Braddock and turnpike roads, to the north of the latter.

The First, Second, and Third Divisions will, if necessary, support the Fourth and Fifth Divisions

X. In this movement the First, Second, and Third Divisions will form the command of Brigadier-General Holmes; the Fourth and Fifth Divisions that of the second in command. The reserve will move upon the plains between Mitchell's Ford and stone bridge, and, together with the Fourth and Fifth Divisions, will be under the immediate direction of General Beauregard.

By command of General BEAUREGARD :

THOMAS JORDAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
July 21, 1861—4:30 A.M.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }
No. —

The plan of attack given by Brigadier-General Beauregard in the above order is approved and will be executed accordingly.

J. E. JOHNSTON,
General C. S. Army.

SUMMARY OF THE ART OF WAR.

PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS, ETC.

PRINCIPLES.

The whole science of war may be briefly defined as the art of placing in the right position, at the right time, a mass of troops greater than your enemy can there oppose to you.

PRINCIPLE NO. 1.—*To place masses of your army in contact with fractions of your enemy.*

PRINCIPLE NO. 2.—*To operate as much as possible on the communications of your enemy without exposing your own.*

PRINCIPLE NO. 3.—*To operate always on interior lines (or shorter ones in point of time).*

Every true *maxim* in war can be deduced from the above given *principles*, it being of course understood that they are to be reversed in speaking of the operations of the

enemy—*i.e.*, care must be taken, first, to prevent your enemy from bringing the mass of his forces in contact with fractions of your own, or large fractions against small ones; second, to prevent him from operating on your communications without exposing his own; third, to prevent his moving on interior or shorter lines.

These three principles supply an infallible test by which to judge of every military plan; for no combination can be well conceived, no maxim founded in truth, which is at variance with them.

By operating on the interior lines which the distribution of your adversary affords you, you may march against one of his separated fractions with your whole force, and after destroying it proceed to the next, and so on; you will thus defeat them in detail by bringing the mass of your army in contact with successive fractions of your enemy. Principle 3 indicates that the hostile fraction which you should first attack is one of the flanks, since it will take the enemy double the time to concentrate his whole force on either flank that would be required to effect his concentration on the centre.

In war it is an axiom that *every possible chance of success must be enlisted on your side.*

MAXIMS.

MAXIM 1.—*Never abandon your line of communication from over-confidence.*

MAXIM 2.—*Although it is a maxim never to abandon your line of communication, yet to change that line is one of the most skillful manœuvres of the art of war, where circumstances authorize it.*

MAXIM 3.—*If you march to the conquest of a country with two or three armies which have each its line of opera-*

tion toward a fixed point where they are to unite, it is a maxim that the union of these different corps d'armée must never take place near the enemy, because not only may the enemy, by concentrating his forces, prevent their junction, but he may moreover beat them in detail.

The route by which an army marches toward its object must be sheltered by its own frontiers, or by some natural obstacle throughout as great an extent as is possible.

That part of the base of operations is the most advantageous to break out from into the theatre of war which conducts the most directly upon the enemy's flank or rear.

MAXIM 4.—*An army ought to have but one line of operation, which it must carefully guard and never abandon, except from an overruling necessity.*

MAXIM 5.—*When two armies are ranged in battle, and one of them has but one point to retreat upon, while the other can retreat on all the points of the compass, all the advantage is with the last. It is in such a case that a commander should be bold to strike great blows, and manœuvre on his enemy's flank. Victory is in his hands.*

MAXIM 6.—*It is one of the most important principles of war to unite the scattered bodies of an army at the point which is the most distant and the best protected from the attempts of an enemy.*

MAXIM 7.—*To operate by lines distant from each other, and without intercommunication, is a fault which generally leads to another. The advancing columns of an army must be in constant communication with each other, so that an enemy cannot penetrate between them.*

MAXIM 8.—*The communication between the different fractions of an army, whether in position or in movement, must always be perfectly open and easy.*

MAXIM 9.—*To besiege a fortified place whose possession would be useless to yourself, and which gives the enemy no power of annoyance, is to waste time and means.*

The places which an invading army is justified in besieging are such as come within the meaning of the definitions of *strategical* points and *decisive* points.

Every point on the theatre of war, whatever be its nature, which conduces in any manner to strengthen your line of operation or of communication is a *strategical point*.

Decisive strategical points are those only which are decisive in insuring the success of any operations of strategy, either for offence or defence.

MAXIM 10.—*The excellence of a position is always relative :*

1. *To that occupied by the enemy.*
2. *To the number of troops intended to line it.*
3. *To the composition of those troops.*

MAXIM 11.—*A position must not be commanded by heights in the direction of the enemy within artillery range.*

MAXIM 12.—*Every position must cover the line of communication of the army with its base.*

MAXIM 13.—*The lines by which the army must retreat from its position, if defeated, must be as numerous and easy as possible.*

In forming a line of battle, special respect must be had to the line or lines by which the army may be obliged to retire. The more directly these lead toward the base of operation the better. The more of these lines available, the greater the security in which the army will fight, and the greater the probability that, if defeated, it will be able to effect its retreat without any overwhelming disaster.

MAXIM 14.—*The part or parts of a line of battle which are in front of any line or lines of retreat must be made the strongest (if not so already from natural causes), either by entrenchments or by posting the greatest force at such parts of your line.*

If the enemy attack and that break part of your line which is in front of your line of retreat, your army, divided into two parts, may be forced back toward the flanks, and the enemy may gain possession of your line of retreat.

MAXIM 15.—*Every position must afford easy communication, in rear of the line, between the different parts of your line of battle.*

MAXIM 16.—*The ground in front of your position should be such as to impede the movements of an enemy advancing to attack you, and should be so completely commanded by your position as to insure its being swept by your artillery to the full extent of its range.*

Such ground will be more slowly traversed by the enemy; he will be exposed for a longer time to the fire of your guns, which will have the effect of disordering his march, and damping his ardor in a degree proportioned to the difficulty of the ground he has to pass over.

MAXIM 17.—*Every position must afford secure protection to the flanks of your army.*

This is a deduction from Principles 1 and 2, since its observance will prevent the enemy from applying them at your expense:

Principle 1, by placing himself in such a position as will enable him to attack the flank of your line, the nature of which manœuvre is to bring masses of the attacking force in contact with successive fractions of the line attacked.

Principle 2, by turning your flank and acting on your line of retreat.

Strong natural obstacles afford the best protection, such as mountains, large rivers, impenetrable woods, marshes, etc. Where these do not exist, the flanks must be strengthened by artificial means.

MAXIM 18.—*A position cannot be too strong; lose no opportunity of strengthening it by means of field-works.*

The natural positions which are generally met with cannot protect an army from the attacks of a superior force without the aid of art.

MAXIM 19.—*Occupy your position in such a manner that you can defend a part of it with a smaller force than that which the enemy can bring against it, so that the greater part of your force may be available to assail the weaker of the enemy.*

If two armies, A and B, of 20,000 men each, occupy lines of equal length; but A, by reason of the ground being naturally stronger on the right half of his line, or by reason of intrenchments, is able to occupy that half effectively with only 5,000 men, while the force of B is equally disseminated, then (to use a technical term) the 5,000 of A *contain* 10,000 of B; while A has 15,000 wherewith to overwhelm the opposing 10,000 of B.

If your force is superior to that of the enemy, you should not, therefore, occupy a greater front than that of the enemy, but hold your surplus troops in hand ready to take advantage of any opening that may be afforded. You will thus be able to insure the superiority at the decisive point and time.

If A and B consist respectively of 20,000 and 10,000 men, and A occupies a front twice as extended as that of B, then A loses the advantage of numbers, for B can bring to bear on an opposite part of A's line a force equal to that which can oppose it, and that part may be broken before succor from the distant portion of A's line can arrive.

It must never be forgotten that *it is not the number of troops ranged in order of battle which decides the victory, but the number which is actually put in vigorous action by a commander.*

MAXIM 20.—*When on the eve of a battle recall all your detachments; do not neglect one, however small; one battalion the more sometimes decides the day.*

In the same manner as no part of a position can be too strong, a master of the art of war will never consider that he has too many troops, no matter how small may be his enemy's force.

MAXIM 21.—*Never detach a force, either on the eve or on the day of a battle, for the purpose of co-operating with your main body in attacking the enemy, unless your communications with the detachment can be constantly maintained.*

Unless communication is maintained, there can be no concert. Nothing should be left to accident. If a force be detached to such a distance that its communication with the main body is not constant and *rapid*, however well a combination may be conceived, a thousand accidents may disconcert it.

If a body of troops be detached to a distance from the main army round a flank of the enemy, for the purpose of attacking the enemy in rear in an approaching battle, a watchful enemy will learn the movement and overwhelm the detachment.

MAXIM 22.—*Never leave intervals between the different divisions of your line of battle where the enemy might penetrate, unless to draw him into a snare.*

It results as a corollary from the last maxim that you must never weaken any part of your line to such an extent that a vigorous attack upon it by the enemy will probably succeed, and enable him to act as has been above described ; also that, unless you have a great superiority of force, it is dangerous to attack an enemy's line by both extremities at once ; for, as both attacks must be reinforced at the expense of your centre, your centre becomes weakened, and a counter-attack upon it by the enemy may succeed.

MAXIM 23.—*Never attack with a fraction of your force when a short delay will enable you to attack with masses.*

The temptation or supposed necessity may sometimes be great, but yielding to it will almost invariably increase the evil it is intended to remedy.

MAXIM 24.—*Nothing can be more rash or contrary to the principles of war than to make a flank march before an enemy in position.*

MAXIM 25.—*There are two ways of obliging an enemy to abandon a position, viz., by attacking and driving him from it, and by manœuvring so as to make it impossible for him to hold it.*

The first method should only be adopted when, in consequence of having a superior force, or of the enemy's position being faulty, it is your object to bring on a decisive engagement.

The mode of applying the second is in general to threaten the enemy's line of communication.

MAXIM 26.—*An attack on the enemy's centre, if successful, is in general the most decisive. That on a flank is the most secure.*

The centre of a line is not only the strongest naturally, from its position enabling it to be *doubly* reinforced from each wing in half the time required to reinforce one wing from the other, but, in addition, its strength is artificially increased by every possible means; the fire of the guns of a position likewise, all converging on the ground over which the enemy must advance to attack the centre, renders the attack on that point more doubtful than one upon a flank. As a general rule the attack of a position should be made on the weakest points, or on points which are so decisive that an attack upon any other is impossible or dangerous, so long as they remain in the enemy's possession.

The weakest points are the flanks when not supported, or any salient points of the enemy's line which are not

well defended by his artillery in position, or any point of his line where he has left an interval, or which he has not occupied in sufficient force.

In choosing a point of attack, one should be preferred from which the assailants, if repulsed, may with safety retreat, rather than another which may offer greater temptations to attack, but the line of retreat from which would be exposed.

MAXIM 27.—*If your enemy is entrenching and it is your intention to attack his position, do not delay a moment. Every hour's delay may cost the loss of 1,000 men in an assault.*

MAXIM 28.—*An army on the march and an army in position in an enemy's country, should never be for one moment without its advanced guard and its advanced posts.*

There are two descriptions of advanced posts, viz. : those which are to be maintained against attack to the last, and those which are only to be defended sufficiently long to enable the army they cover to form in order of battle before an enemy can attack it.

No precaution, therefore, which will strengthen such posts and enable the defenders to keep the enemy at bay, if only for five minutes, should be neglected. An officer is not worthy of the name who, in command of an outpost, does not feel that the safety of the whole army may depend on his individual vigilance, who neglects any possible expedient to strengthen his post, and who does not make himself thoroughly acquainted with the ground to a considerable distance around it, asking himself frequently what he should do if attacked.

MAXIM 29.—*To defend a defile, never take post in front, but always in rear of the defile.*

This will enable the defenders to attack with their whole force any fraction of the enemy they may think proper to allow to emerge from the defile.

No position, however good otherwise, should be occupied by an army which has a defile in its rear through which the army must retreat if defeated. A retreat through a defile before an enemy is always disastrous.

The case of an army defending the head of a bridge is an exception to this.

It follows that you should never lose an opportunity of attacking an enemy in retreat, while in the act of passing a defile, allowing any portion of his army you think proper to enter it, and then attacking with your whole force the remaining fraction.

All passes over mountains are of the nature of defiles.

A bridge is essentially a defile; and, in the same way as important passes are defended by forts, a bridge over a great river is defended by fortifications of more or less strength.

MAXIM 30.—*Every disadvantage may be removed by skill or fortune, except TIME. If a General has TIME against him, he must fail. And conversely, TIME is the best ally.*

MAXIM 31.—*As a general rule, the column of divisions is the most convenient order of march; the line is the best formation for collision.*

Every rule in war may, if true, be traced to one of the three principles. The present is derived from No. 1, as by attacking lines with columns, the greater number of the men composing the column are unable either to fire or act offensively in any manner, while every man in the line can be brought into play, thus bringing the greater number of the line in contact with the smaller of the column.

It must be borne in mind that no rule can be absolute in war; every one is subject to modification from actual circumstances. Although the column is the most convenient order of march generally, and the only safe order when exposed to cavalry attack, it is not always the safest.

MAXIM 32.—*All movements of troops must be made in such a manner as will expose them to the least possible amount of injury from an enemy.*

Therefore, in the case where troops advancing to attack an enemy's position are exposed to the fire of a powerful artillery, the advance should be made in line.

MAXIM 33.—*All movements in presence of an enemy must be made in that order which will admit of the formation of the line of battle in the shortest possible time.*

This maxim is peculiarly applicable to a flank march within reach of an enemy, or to a movement whose object is to prolong one flank. In moving to the front when threatened by cavalry, the march is executed in column at quarter-distance, because from that formation the order of battle is assumed in the shortest possible time (viz. : that of the square).

In moving to a flank within reach of an enemy, where cavalry attack is not imminent, or where sufficient protection is afforded by the cavalry of the army so moving, the march should be executed in column at full distance, because (the line having been established as the proper order for collision—see Maxim 31), from that formation, line is formed with the least possible delay by a simple wheel of divisions into line.

When it is desired to prolong a line to one flank to a comparatively small extent, it may be done by the march of successive battallions or brigades from the other flank in rear of the line. The flank march is in this case protected and concealed by the general line.

When time presses, the same object may be accomplished by moving up to the flank of the first line the nearest battalions or brigades of the second line, making a simultaneous flank movement of the second line to a sufficient extent to cover the prolongation of the first, and

supplying its deficiency on the other flank by battalions or brigades drawn from the first line.

MAXIM 34.—*Of all the attacks to which a body of troops can be exposed, that upon the flank is the most dangerous.*

This is deduced from Principle I. For, suppose a battalion in line, which we may call A, to be attacked by another line, B, which has succeeded in establishing itself perpendicularly to the direction of A, on one of its flanks. The commander of A will endeavor to change his front so as to form a line parallel to B, in order to meet its attack. Should B be at a sufficient distance to enable A to complete its change of front, no inconvenience will ensue; but if not, only a part of A will have been able to assume the required parallel formation at the time when it is attacked by B's whole force, and driven back on the remaining divisions of the battalion, which will be attacked and overthrown by B in succession.

The most advantageous direction which a line can assume for the purpose of attacking another line in flank is perpendicular to that of the line to be attacked; and the more nearly perpendicular, the greater is the advantage.

The attack on the head of a column is analogous to that on the flank of a line; but it is more ruinous in its effects.

The echelon formation combines to a certain extent the advantages of the line and column. For mere changes of position, the movement in oblique echelon saves much time. For an advance against an enemy in position, the direct echelon formation presents advantages afforded by no other. It combines the greater correctness of the march in column with the superior force, for collision, of the line.

The head of the echelon is the only part the enemy can attack without exposing his own flank. The retired flank can only be turned by a long march on the part of the enemy; it may, therefore, be considered safe, and the

advanced wing, with which you first attack, may be reinforced at the expense of that which is retired. Thus, in less than the time which would be required by the enemy to turn the retired flank, you may gain some decided advantage with the other.

In general terms, the advantages of the echelon formation are that one flank is thereby secure from attack—each division of the echelon covers the flank of that which precedes it, and the exposed flank may be reinforced at the expense of the other; thereby observing Maxim 19, since, by reason of the distance which separates them, one wing of the enemy is held in check by the retired wing of the echelon, which has been weakened in order to reinforce the head of the echelon which is the point of collision.

The retired flank being safe, it remains only to secure the head of the echelon from flank attack.

In case of there being no flank support for the head of the echelon, the greater part of the artillery and cavalry must support that flank.

If two armies of equal strength are opposed to each other, and one of them has its flanks strongly posted, while one or both of the flanks of the other are unsupported, the general line of the last may be parallel to that of the first, and the exposed flank or flanks may be protected by several bodies of troops being posted in echelon to their rear; the enemy dare not attack the exposed flank, because his own flank would be in danger from the troops in echelon, and he could not make a long flank march to turn the flank of those troops without exposing his line of retreat.

Frederick's system was to attack one wing of his enemy's army with one of his own wings, reinforced for that purpose at the expense of the other, remedying the weakness of his other wing by removing it beyond the reach of



attack. He formed his line obliquely to that of the enemy, and then marched in the prolongation of his own line until he outflanked the wing he designed to attack.

When an army from the parallel order assumes the oblique order with respect to an enemy, the first consideration must be the line of retreat. The usual means of effecting the change is by keeping one flank in its original position and throwing back the other.

The general of an army which has effected such a change of front should, as a general rule, post the greater strength of his second line in the rear of his advanced wing, and hold his reserve somewhere behind the centre of that wing.

Such a change of position, however, in presence of a watchful and able enemy ought to be impossible; and it is only by surprise that a general can hope to place his army *en masse* in a position to attack one of his enemy's flanks.

In order to attempt successfully the oblique order by a flank march in the neighborhood of an enemy, the march of the army must be concealed from the enemy.

The line of retreat of the army which takes the oblique order must always be in rear of the advanced wing.

The greater the obliquity of the army to the enemy's line, the greater the security of the refused flank from counter-attack, and the greater the probability of success. And this only brings us to the perfection of flank attack, which is when the direction of the army is perpendicular to that of the enemy.

If an enemy endeavors to turn one of your flanks by moving his whole army to that flank, there are several modes of defeating his intention:

1st. If he marches in such an order that he cannot readily resume his line of battle facing your army, make a

vigorous attack on the flank of his march along his whole line.

2d. If he marches as above in loose order, so as to leave any large interval between the different divisions of his army, attack one of the separated portions—suppose the rear portion—by interposing a body of troops between it and the rest of the army, to stop the head of its march while you direct other troops against the flank of its march.

3d. If he marches compactly, and in such an order as will enable him to re-form his line in a moment, you must choose the head or the rear of his line of march for attack; but the attack must be made with method and supported by cavalry, or the enemy's cavalry (which will be found at both those points) will take your infantry in flank.

4th. You may prolong your line to the threatened flank by either of the methods already given, and turn the tables on the enemy by outflanking him.

The effective force of an army in battle depends chiefly on the rapidity and precision with which it can manœuvre; and the basis of its excellence in this particular is found in the proficiency of each battalion and squadron in field movements. The effective force of an army in battle depends chiefly on the rapidity with which its marches are conducted; and as the success of an action may often be influenced by the order of march in which an army approaches an enemy in position, it is impossible that the troops can be too much practised in every possible order of march.

In all armies, ancient and modern, the line of battle has been divided into units, whose magnitude has been determined by the average range of the human voice. The unit should be as large as is consistent with the possibility of the men composing it, when formed in line, being directed by the voice of the commander.

The battalion is taken as the unit of the infantry line. The squadron and the battery as that of the cavalry and artillery respectively.

In our army, 500 men in two ranks form a line of about 150 yards, as many as are usually found in the field, supernumeraries and non-effectives being taken into account : *i.e.*, three and a third men to one yard, or 5,867 to one mile ; or 5,000 men to one mile, allowing for space between regiments, etc. ; a greater extent of line might be inconvenient, although it is certain that in an attack the larger the mass to which unity of impulse can be communicated without confusion, the greater will be the chances of success.

The art of directing troops in battle consists in the just employment of the three arms in such a manner that they shall mutually support and defend each other to as great an extent as possible. No fixed rule can be laid down as to their relative proportion in the composition of an army. That must depend very much on the nature of the country in which an army operates.

But where such country is favorable to the march and action of those arms, a good proportion is :

Cavalry, one fifth of the infantry ; artillery, three guns for every thousand men of infantry and cavalry united.

Nothing can be more opposed to the rules of war than for infantry alone to attack an enemy's infantry in position which is defended by artillery. The fire of the latter will throw the attacking force into confusion, and will expose it to an easy overthrow if it should succeed in reaching the position to be assaulted.

When an officer is on active service in the field, every thing connected with the daily life of his men should be an object of constant attention ; no detail is beneath him. He must not think the arms and ammunition his most

important charge, and that if they be in fighting order he need not trouble himself much about the rest.

The arms are the fighting weapons, but the soldier is the machine which wields them; and it is to him—to clothing his back, and feeding his belly, and looking after his health and comfort—that the great attention is due. The arms and ammunition must of course be always in perfect order, but they are only required when in contact with an enemy. The natural condition of a soldier on service is the line of march. He will have at least twenty days of marching to one of fighting; and he has to be preserved in health and comfort during those twenty days, otherwise his musket and pouch would do small service on the twenty-first day.

An officer should go among his men and himself look after their comfort. No fear of their losing respect for him because he does so. At the end of a march he should never feel at liberty to attend to his own wants until he has seen his men engaged in cooking their meals. The rapidity with which a regiment has its fires lighted after a march, and meals cooked, may be regarded as a test of the attention paid by the officers to the comfort of their men.

Similarly before a march, an officer should take care that none of his men leave their encampment or bivouac without as good a meal as circumstances permit.

As regards equipment for the field, an officer must have as few wants as possible; and he should carefully study the art of putting up the articles it is necessary he should possess in the smallest possible compass. The line of march must be considered as the natural condition of a soldier, and every thing regulated with that view.

An officer charged with the arrangement of any military movement or operation should on no account trust to the

intelligence of subordinates who are to execute it. He should anticipate and provide against every misconception or stupidity it is possible to foresee, and give all the minute directions he would think necessary if he knew the officer charged with the execution of the operation to be the most stupid of mankind.

No amount of disapprobation of his general's plans can justify an officer in canvassing those plans with others, and openly finding fault with them. A great many young gentlemen (and old gentlemen too, for that matter) set up for generals, and habitually ridicule the dispositions of their superiors. Such a practice is insubordinate and mischievous in the highest degree; the soldiers acquire the habit from those whose duty it is to set an example; they lose that confidence in their general which is one of the principal elements of success in military operations, and infinite mischief results.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

OUTPOST SERVICE.

I. The commanders of all detached army corps, divisions, brigades, or regiments of this army, on arriving at a position to be occupied, will carefully reconnoitre, personally and by staff officers, the ground in the vicinity, and all roads and approaches thereto, for a distance of several miles, especially in the known direction of the enemy. The best positions for holding all such approaches under vigilant observation, and for the prevention of surprise, will be carefully selected for the advanced line of picket sentries, which shall not be less than one mile distant from the main body of the command, nor more than three miles. The force to be employed in this outpost service shall habitually be not less than one fifth of the command

from which it may be detached, and the tour of duty will be for three days.

2. The post of the regiment, battalion, or detachment on outpost service will be selected at a convenient central point, about half a mile in rear of the front line to be occupied by sentinels, and *there* will be the reserve and place for baggage and cooking. One third of the command or detachment will be thrown forward in three equal parties, equidistant from each other, to within two hundred yards of the extreme picket front; and from these detachments smaller detachments, each of from three to six privates, with a commissioned or non-commissioned officer in charge, from which a continuous line of sentries will be established along the entire front to be held and observed, connecting at all times with the sentinels on the right and left, thrown forward either by the pickets, posts of the same regiment, battalion, or detachment, or established from other regiments, battalions, or detachments on outpost service. At night the number of sentinels will be doubled.

3. Sentinels on picket should be so established as to observe as much and as far as possible, while themselves concealed from observation by the enemy. Loud talking, singing, whistling, and fires, except at the reserve—and, in very cold weather, on the line of company or detachment reserves,—is strictly prohibited. Citizens must not be allowed to stay or lounge about the picket posts or converse with pickets; this is particularly enjoined, for, under the pretence of hospitality and the simulation of the simple countryman, an insidious spy may be lurking to discover our signal of recognition, countersigns, passwords, or other information to be betrayed to our injury.

4. Officers and non-commissioned officers and soldiers on picket service are at all times dressed and equipped.

The commander of each outpost command will make frequent visits and inspections of his advanced detachments, picket posts, and front line of sentinels; and he will be responsible for any surprise of his lines or lax, negligent performance of picket service by his officers and men during the tour. He will give proper instructions to all under his command touching their several duties, and should satisfy himself that those instructions are well understood and rigidly executed. His adjutant, or some other officer selected for the duty, will also visit each picket post and sentry once each night, between twelve o'clock and daylight.

5. When a day signal of recognition has been arranged for any picket line, it will be demanded as soon as the parties see each other. At night parties approaching will be halted at a distance of sixty yards, if practicable, in a loud distinct tone, and the signal demanded. The party challenged will then require a response from the challenging party; this made, the latter will order the former to advance and give the countersign. Commanders of outposts will be careful not to prevent or delay the passing of cavalry pickets or couriers with despatches; but when reasonable doubts arise as to the character of the party, he must be sent, under charge of guard, at once to the headquarters of the nearest general office. A mounted man will not be required to dismount to give the countersign, after having made the proper signal, nor will the countersign be required in the daytime. Great circumspection must be exercised in the use of signals to prevent their observation by lurking spies of the enemy.

6. An approach of the enemy must be resisted by the pickets as obstinately as practicable; the ground must only be yielded before an overwhelming force; they will then retire, fighting, on the reserve, where a stand will be

made as long as practicable. If forced to retire, they will take up successive positions behind all advantageous shelter, and resolutely check and retard the advance of the enemy as long as possible. The best marksmen will be selected to cover the rear, while thus falling back, who will fire with deliberation as they retire. If pressed closely by the enemy, the command must be brought, if possible, to charge with the bayonet. The utmost care must be taken to prevent the men from crowding *en masse* in falling back, as they will offer a target for artillery; and the men must be cautioned against and prevented from making a precipitate retreat from an outpost under any circumstances.

7. While on outpost duty, no officer or soldier will be permitted to leave the outpost without express authority from the commander, except upon a surgeon's certificate. Commanders of outposts must remain constantly during the tour with their reserve, except when visiting the picket posts and sentries, in which case they will leave these instructions with the officer next in command.

8. In marching to and from outposts, the utmost order and discipline will be preserved. *No straggling must be permitted*

9. As soon as the pickets may become seriously engaged with the enemy, any baggage at the post of the reserve will be immediately sent to the rear, to the baggage of the brigade to which the detachment belongs. Troops on outpost service are expected to bivouac.

10. As soon as the enemy shall have developed with certainty a design to advance, the commanders of outposts will at once despatch couriers to the general commanding the corps or division to which the outpost belongs, giving information of the movements of the enemy, his probable strength, kind of force, and whether

moving rapidly or not, route or routes taken, and such other information as may be of service. The report of mere rumored movements must always be avoided, or at least distinguished from what may be ascertained by the military.

11. The commander of each outpost will publish these orders every tour, before establishing his picket post or posting his picket sentries; they will likewise be read to each company or detachment of the line of advanced picket parties. They will be carefully preserved and transferred to the next commanders of the outpost.

12. Any person found in the act of eluding the outposts, and failing to halt when directed to do so, will be fired upon by the sentinels; and any person if suspected of eluding the outposts, will be at once arrested and sent to the nearest provost marshal.

13. Cavalry pickets will be required, by sentries and picket posts, to show authority of their colonel or other commander for the service before being allowed to pass; and couriers, with dispatches, must be furnished with passes properly signed.

14. The roll of troops at outposts must be called frequently during the day, and at retreat there shall be an inspection of arms and ammunition.

15. Staff officers must be sent by the general, or other officer in command, to inspect the outposts of his command.

16. Sentries must always be ready to fire, but will be sure of the presence of the enemy before firing, and will carefully avoid *false alarms*. Once satisfied that the enemy is at hand, a sentry, though all defence on his part may be useless, must fire, as the safety of the army may depend on the alarm he will then give. Picket sentries should be relieved every hour at night, and, as a precau-

tion against surprise, should be instructed in some signal for the night, before giving the countersign to others of the same outpost detachment.

17. In the immediate or near presence of the enemy the main and company reserves must stand to their arms for an hour before daybreak. Patrols will be made slowly, silently, and with the utmost precaution, to insure against surprise or being mistaken for the enemy by our own men. When patrols are sent out, information of the fact must be spread throughout the picket posts and sentries.

CAVALRY PICKETS AND VEDETTES.

18. In addition to infantry outposts, the whole front of any force in position or camp must be completely observed and covered by cavalry; all commanding points of observation will be occupied; and all possible avenues of approach will be watched, as near to the enemy's lines as the nature of the country will admit, or as he will permit without substantial resistance. Positions must be avoided which the enemy can approach under cover or turn. There must be an unbroken line of communication on the right and left, between all the posts and vedettes. The horse should be relieved by his rider as much as possible, but when near the *enemy the vedette must never quit his rein or take off bridle or saddle.*

19. Cavalry picket detachments, when practicable, will consist of entire companies, and each company will cover its proportion of the front to be occupied. The picket posts, detached in advance, will not be of less than one non-commissioned officer and three troopers each. The captain of each company will serve as *officer of the guard* for his company on picket service, and a field

officer, or senior captain, will be *officer of the day* for the whole line of the regiment, battalion, or squadron on out-post duty.

20. The company commander will be habitually with the reserve, established at a central point in the rear of the picket posts.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Genl. Commanding.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR BATTLE.

1. Field and company officers are specially enjoined to instruct their men, under all circumstances, to fire with deliberation at the feet of the enemy; they will thus avoid overshooting, and, besides, wounded men give more trouble to our adversary than his dead, as they have to be taken from the field.

2. Officers in command must be cool and collected in action, hold their men in hand, and caution them against useless, aimless firing. The men must be instructed and required each one to single out his mark. It was the deliberate sharp-shooting of our forefathers in the Revolution of 1776, and at New Orleans in 1815, which made them so formidable against the odds with which they were engaged.

3. In the beginning of a battle, except by troops deployed as skirmishers, the fire by file will be avoided; it excites the men, and renders their subsequent control difficult; fire by wing or company should be resorted to instead. During the battle, the officers and non-commissioned officers must keep the men in ranks, enforce obedience, and encourage and stimulate them if necessary.

4. Soldiers must not be permitted to quit the ranks to strip or rob the dead, or even to assist in removing our own

wounded, unless by special permission, which shall only be given when the action has been decided. The surest way to protect our wounded is to drive the enemy from the field; the most pressing, highest duty is to win the victory.

5. Before the battle, the quartermaster of the division will make all the necessary arrangements for the immediate transportation of the wounded from the field. After consulting with the medical officers, he will establish the ambulance depot in the rear, and give his assistants the necessary instructions for the efficient service of the ambulance wagons and other means of transportation.

6. The ambulance depot, to which the wounded are to be conveyed or directed for immediate treatment, should be established at the most convenient building nearest the field of battle. A red flag marks the place and way to it.

7. Before and immediately after battle the roll of each company will be called, and absentees must strictly account for their absence from the ranks. To quit their standard on the battle-field under fire, under the pretense of removing or aiding the wounded, will not be permitted. Any one persisting in it will be shot on the spot; and whoever shall be found to have quit the field, or his company or regiment, without authority, will be regarded and proclaimed as a coward, and dealt with accordingly.

8. The active ambulances will follow the troops to succor the wounded, and to remove them to the depots. Before the engagement Infirmary detachments will also be detailed and organized, of three (the least effective under arms) from each company, whose duties will be hereinafter prescribed. *These men must not loiter about the depots, but will return promptly to the field as soon as possible.*

9. The Infirmary detachments will be under the immediate orders of the medical officers on the field. This

corps is to go upon the field unarmed, except the non-commissioned officers, who are to protect the corps against stragglers and marauders. The members will be provided with one litter to every two men, and each with a badge by which he can be easily distinguished by the rest of the command ; also with leather shoulder-straps, a canteen of water, a tin cup, a haversack, containing an eighth-pound of lint, four bandages, two long and two short splints of wood, sponges and tourniquets, and a pint bottle of alcoholic stimulants.

10. It shall be the duty of this corps, under the immediate direction of the assistant surgeon of the regiment, accompanied by the ambulances or wagons, to follow up promptly the action, administering to the immediate wants of the wounded, by giving stimulus, checking hemorrhage, and the temporary splinting of fractures.

11. Those who are too much disabled to walk will be removed to some ambulance depot, previously agreed upon, where they will be left in charge of the surgeon of the regiment. The removal of the wounded from the field will devolve upon the Infirmary corps, and all men straggling from the ranks under the pretext of aiding this corps, will be summarily dealt with, to which end the medical officers in charge and the non-commissioned officers are specially required to report to the regimental commanders of the stragglers, their names, and the companies to which they may belong.

12. The assistant surgeon in charge of the Infirmary corps should provide himself with a pocket-case, ligatures, needles, pins, chloroform, napkins, brandy or whiskey, tourniquets, bandages, lint, and spirits. To relieve the shock of the nervous system, suppress hemorrhage, to put fractures in some temporary apparatus, so as to facilitate the removal of the wounded, should be his first care.

This last is best accomplished by placing under the fractured limb a piece of old linen or cotton of the form of a pocket-handkerchief ; on the opposite and outer edges of this are placed the splints, which are rolled up in it, toward the lint, on each side, until the fracture is snugly supported in the intervening space, the whole to be secured by two or three bands of tape or bandage.

13. The regimental surgeon should, before an action, satisfy himself by personal inspection that all the means and appliances for carrying the wounded are at hand ; give instructions to the Infirmary corps as to the application of a tourniquet to restrain dangerous hemorrhage ; establish depots for the wounded, under the supervision of the medical director ; and render to the men of his regiment all necessary surgical aid ; performing there all operations that are required ; and he will be held responsible that he has at his disposition all the means, supplies, and appliances for the proper performance of the service enjoined, or has taken all proper measures to secure them. He will instruct all detailed to assist him not to allow ambulances to be monopolized by wounded officers to the exclusion of others. He will forbid any of the Infirmary corps to hold officers' horses on the field, or to do any thing but what strictly appertains to their duty. The surgeon should not devote himself exclusively to a wounded officer, nor leave his post to accompany him to the rear.

14. Wounds will be dressed and operations performed as far as practicable *on the field*, and patients made as comfortable as circumstances will admit for transportation to hospitals in the interior.

15. Surgeons will supply themselves with hospital flags, and will have them attached to the ambulances and placed conspicuously over the field infirmaries and hospitals.

16. As soon as possible after an action, surgeons will transmit to the medical director a return of casualties according to the following form :

RETURN OF THE KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE ——— REGIMENT
IN THE ACTION OF ———.

	Killed.	WOUNDED.			Total Wounded.	REMARKS.
		Dangerously.	Severely.	Slightly.		
Officers						Names of officers killed and wounded to be inserted here.
N.-C. Officers...						
Privates						

17. The material for the badges and for the ambulance flags prescribed in paragraph 6 will be provided by the quartermaster's department.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,
Genl. Comdg.

THE END.

